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Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three independent essays on econometrics and economics
of education. The first chapter investigates how the Research Excellence Framework (REF)
perceives the quality of economics journals. Exploiting aggregate information available
in the published REF dataset, we propose a novel algorithm within an ordered probit
framework that provides an effective recovery of underlying disaggregated outcomes (i.e.
individual submission). The estimated results can be viewed as a directory for predicting
the perception of journal quality for the REF 2014 exercise. In the second chapter, I sug-
gest a new matching methodology—the Dirichlet process (DP) matching—that has several
important advantages compared to conventional matching methods, including the balanc-
ing property, a more efficient ATT estimator and a credible confidence band. I describe
the DP matching as a story of the “Chinese restaurant with invited guests”. In the third
chapter, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment, namely the PelCa program in Ecuador,
and study its consequences on mothers’ empowerment and children’s early development.
We find optimistic evidence that the program helped mothers rear their children in a more
learning conductive environment, resulting in positive effects on children outcomes and
greater empowerment in mothers at home and in the community.
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Introduction
This thesis comprises three independent essays in the fields of econometrics and economics
of educations, documented in Chapter 1, 2 and 3. The structure of the thesis is illustrated
in Figure 1.
In particular, Chapter 1 investigates how the Research Excellence Framework (REF),
last held in 2014 to assess the research quality in British higher education institutions over
the period 2008-2013, perceive economics journals in their assessment system. Exploiting
on-line published data on submitted research outputs of different REF quality standards,
which is only available at the institutional level, we propose a novel algorithm within an
ordered probit framework that allows us to distinguish the censored REF standards for
each individual submission and to estimate how economics journals were perceived by
the Economics and Econometrics sub-panel and the Business and Management Studies
sub-panel. In particular, we develop an efficient Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
sampling scheme for the inference and also suggest a robust and weakly informative prior
distribution to overcome the potential separation problem. This is the first paper to employ
a standard regression model to directly predict the perception of journal quality for the
REF 2014 exercise. The estimated results can be viewed as a directory for determining to
what extent each economics journal meets the criteria set by the REF 2014. Our proposed
method can be generalised to other generalised linear models where the outcomes are
censored at an aggregate level.
Chapter 2 focuses on the estimation of the average treatment effect in evaluation stud-
ies. There have been concerns that 1) conventional matching methods such as the propen-
sity score matching cannot ensure the balancing property of the matched pairs; 2) the
1
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estimator for the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) could be more efficient
when a theoretical full covariates matching is employed; however, full covariates matching
is not typically feasible in practice; and 3) two-step matching estimators are practically
feasible but may result in incredibly large confidence intervals of the ATT estimator. The
Dirichlet process (DP) matching strategy proposed in this paper is committed to delivering
a desirable ATT estimator to address these concerns. The algorithm meets the balancing
property by construction. As a compromise of full covariates matching, the DP match-
ing effectively matches the controlled to the treated if their confounders are in the same
covariate space. The whole algorithm is integrated into a single efficient Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) scheme and the resulting standard deviations can be viewed as an
honest confidence band for the ATT estimator. I illustrate the usefulness of the proposed
method with an empirical application of the well-known LaLonde (1986) data. I demon-
strate that the DP matching ATT estimator is efficient and closer to the benchmark values
than popular matching approaches.
Chapter 3 empirically evaluates an NGO preschool program in Ecuador. Empowering
women and enhancing children’s early development are two important goals that are often
pursued via independent policy initiatives in developing countries. In this paper we study
a unique approach that pursues both goals at the same time: empowering mothers through
tools that also advance their children’s development. A program operated by AVSI, an
Italian NGO, in a poor neighborhood of Quito, Ecuador, targets parents of children from
birth to age 5. It provides family advisor-guided parent training sessions once every two
weeks for groups of six to eight mothers and their children. We find that the program
empowered women in various dimensions: treated mothers are more likely to be employed,
more of them have a full-time job and they are more likely to have a formal-sector job. They
also earn higher wages, and are more likely to make independent decisions regarding their
own sources of money, work outside the home, and continuing their education. Moreover,
there is evidence of a greater role overall in intra-household decisions, especially on issues
involving children’s education and discipline. Treated mothers also increase parental inputs
into their children’s development, who are less likely to repeat a grade or temporarily drop-
2
Introduction
Figure 1: Thesis Structure
Chapter 1 and 2 both contribute to the econometrics and Bayesian econo-
metrics in particular. One important feature that Chapter 1 and Chapter
3 share is their findings both hold paramount importance in the design of
optimal education policy. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are both associated with
estimating the causal effect.
out from schooling, and have higher scores on cognitive tests.
3
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Chapter 1
How Does the REF Panel Perceive Journals?
A New Approach to Estimating Ordinal Re-
sponse Model with Censored Outcomes 1
1.1 Introduction
Research quality has been an important issue for researchers and policymakers in terms
of various decisions such as promotion and public investment in research. The Research
Excellence Framework (REF) is aimed at providing a dynamic and internationally com-
petitive UK research sector, and was designed to assess the research quality in British
higher education institutions over the period 2008-2013. The most recent REF exercise
was held in 2014. The most important task of the REF 2014 is to evaluate the quality and
impact of submitted research outputs from different UK institutions on different subjects.
In December 2014, the REF published the assessment results for each institution in the
form of aggregate proportions of submissions in a given institution that meet four quality
profiles, namely 4*, 3*, 2* and 1* (higher number indicates better quality). By design,
the REF evaluates the research attainment of institutions rather than that of researchers,
1 The authors thank Wiji Arulampalam, Sascha O. Becker, Gianna Boero, François Caron, Mingli
Chen, Victor Lavy, Robin Naylor, Jeremy Smith, and Motty Perry for valuable comments. Zizhong Yan
would like to thank the Department of Economics at the University of Warwick for the financial support.
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and therefore the assessment outcome for each individual submission meeting a specific
standard is actually censored and unobservable by the public. However, it is important
for universities and researchers to know how their papers have been judged by the REF
system. In some subject areas, it is possible that an automated procedure may replicate
the laboratory REF exercise.
In particular, we seek to answer how economics journals or other types of submission
(e.g. books, monographs and working papers) were perceived by the REF panel. In an
ideal case, one can directly answer this question by running an ordinal regression of the
quality outcome of each submission on journal indicators and dummies for other types
of publication. Unfortunately, for the REF 2014 exercise, the only information that is
available about a particular submission (e.g. Economics at the University of Leicester)
is how many of their publications were rated as 4*, 3*, 2* or 1*. This aggregate data is
summarised in Table 1.1. We do not know, however, in which of the four categories the
Leicester Economics department’s 80 papers were submitted.
In fact, this is a common problem in applied economics research—when the objective
is to understand the impact of an individual-level variable, when the outcome of interest
is only available at certain higher levels due to data limitations. This can be because the
outcome measure is published as aggregate statistics (e.g. the REF 2014), or possibly
because the outcome variable must be extracted from another data source.2 Under such
circumstances, a regression of higher level outcomes on lower level covariates can solely
identify the impact on higher level responses, but reveal little information about the impact
at a more local level.
The aim of this paper is to find a solution to reveal this “hidden information”. We de-
velop a novel algorithm within the ordinal response model framework to probabilistically
recover the individual values of the outcomes based on aggregate information at the institu-
tional level. Specifically, our algorithm samples the unobservable outcomes by configuring
2For instance, labour economists often try to understand the effect of wage incomes on people’s health
status based on labour force surveys. Information on wages is provided by the survey data while some of
the objective health measures can only be acquired from an external dataset of medical examinations. In
order to concatenate the outcomes and the covariates, one needs to stratify the health outcomes by group,
such as age or occupational sub-groups. The two datasets are then merged based on these sub-groups.
6
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their conditional posterior densities, and then exchanging their values accordingly. The
exchange of probabilities is conducted for observations at the same level (institutions) so
that the aggregate counts in each institution are still the same. The inference of our model
is integrated into a single MCMC sampling. The conditional posterior of the outcome
values is able to converge to the equilibrium distribution efficiently. For parameters of the
ordered probit model, we propose an efficient Metropolis-Hasting with Laplace approxi-
mation. It is worth mentioning that in our case the performance of the MCMC sampler is
more stable than the Gibbs sampling with a data augmentation procedure by Albert and
Chib (1993), which is a popular choice in sampling posteriors of a probit or logit model.3
In the ordered response model with many dummy variables, a by-product of our al-
gorithm pertains to the hidden collinearity. This happens when the patterns of the RHS
dummy variables, and those of the LHS ordinal outcomes, are highly correlated. This
is known as the separation problem in the statistics literature.4 As a consequence of
separation, the likelihood function is monotonically increasing, and the conventional max-
imum likelihood estimator is unable to reach the maxima. Heinze (2006) and Heinze and
Schemper (2002) have attempted to overcome the separation in a binary logit model by
adopting the Jeffreys prior, which is originally used to correct the small sample bias of
maximum likelihood estimators in generalised linear models (Firth, 1993). However, the
attempts made by Gelman et al. (2008) and our paper all reach the same conclusion that
the Jeffreys prior cannot work stably when correcting the separation problem. As an alter-
native, we adopt an independent Cauchy prior with scale 10 to handle the separation issue
in our ordered probit model, inspired by Gelman et al. (2008) who use the Cauchy prior
with scale 4 for a binary logit model. We extend their justifications to the ordered probit
context. What is important is that in most applied economics studies, the researchers are
only interested in the marginal effects in a probit or logit model instead of the parameters
of the regression model. Based on such preferences, we are able to justify the choice of our
3Dunson (2008) also suggests that, for ordinal response models, a better approach is to use the
Metropolis-Hastings after marginalising out the augmented data.
4Zorn (2005) provides a technical review of the separation problem. In addition,
a review with real examples can be found at the following website of Stata package:
http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/statistics/completely-determined-in-logistic-regression/.
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prior distribution.
We use the REF 2014 dataset to show that our approach can effectively restore the
individual outcomes, as the predicted GPA score of each institution using our method is
very similar to the actual GPA score in the real dataset. To verify the proposed algorithm
and the model further, we implement four simulations using synthetic datasets that are
designed to mimic the true REF data. Additionally, motivated by ideas from the machine
learning literature, we also evaluate the quality of model predictions. Empirically, the
paper most closely related to ours is the study by Hole (2015), who ranks economics
journals by using the same REF 2014 data. His algorithm, built on correlations between
submissions, generates scores for each economics journal. In comparison, the methodology
in this paper does not include any ad-hoc steps, and is set strictly within a standard
regression framework. Besides the point estimators, we also provide the confidence bands
of the estimators.
Our empirical results reveal several interesting findings. First, as expected, famous
journals such as the AER, Econometrica, and QJE are ranked at the very top, whereas the
Economics Letters and other types of publication are ranked at the bottom when looking at
journals with more than 20 submissions. Second, after accounting for journals with a rela-
tively small number of submissions, we find that some new journals (e.g. the Quantitative
Economics and the American Economic Journal series), and qualitative journals (e.g. the
Journal of Economic History and the Explorations in Economic History) have notably high
ranks. Third, we observe institution fixed effects on journal perception. For the same type
of outputs published in the same journal, submissions from UCL, Cambridge, Warwick
and Oxford are perceived more positively (i.e. above the average), whereas submissions
from Brunel, Kent and Aberdeen appear to be perceived less positively. Last, we find that
the perception of journal quality differs across different REF sub-panels.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. In Section 1.2, we present an econo-
metric model, and summarise the MCMC sampling scheme. Section 1.3 shows different
simulations based on an artificial dataset in order to verify the proposed algorithm, and to
screen suitable choices of the link function and the prior distribution for this paper. Section
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1.4 first describes the REF 2014 dataset used in the empirical analysis, and then applies
the algorithm for recovering the outcome variable, and presents the empirical results of the
MCMC samplings. Section 1.5 concludes this paper.
1.2 Model and Algorithm
We now formulate our empirical investigation within an ordered probit model framework
in Section 1.2.1. In Section 1.2.2, the algorithm for predicting the censored outcome
of the REF quality standards is developed under an ordered probit specification. The
algorithm can be viewed as a step in the Gibbs’ cycle and therefore, the censored outcome
can be efficiently sampled via the Gibbs sampling. Section 1.2.3-1.2.4 illustrate the prior
specifications for the ordered probit model in our case. Section 1.2.5 summarises the
MCMC sampling scheme.
1.2.1 Notation and Framework
Let the individual output (corresponding to each individual submission to the REF panel)
be labelled as i and the institution (e.g. the Department of Economics at LSE) as j. Di,k
(k = 1, ...,K) denotes an array of dummy variables for journals or other types of submis-
sion. For simplicity of notation, at this stage we focus on an individual outcome Yi. We
will examine the full model, including the institution index j in Section 1.2.2. The outcome
variable is captured by Yi, indicating ordinal categories for the four REF quality profiles
4*, 3*, 2* and 1*5 (see Section 1.4.1 and Table 1.1 for details). We employ an ordered
probit regression model to examine how each journal, or other type of publication (Dk), is
perceived according to the REF criteria (Y ). Using the latent variable representation, we
specify the model as follows:
Y ∗i = α0 + β
′Di + i, i
iid∼ N (0, σ2) (..)
5In addition to these four classes, a small number of the output that falls below 1* or does not meet
the published standard was rated as “unclassified”. We merge the “unclassified” category with class 1*.
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where i indices the individual output, Di = (Di,1, . . . , Di,K)′ is a K × 1 vector of dummy
covariates for the K types of journals and other submissions, and β = (β1, . . . , βK)′ is a
vector of parameters for Di. Y ∗ is a latent Gaussian variable in the ordered probit model,
and can be stratified into four parts using three cut-off points. The ordinal response Yi
can thus be defined accordingly:
Yi =

1 if Y ∗i < c1
2 if c1 ≤ Y ∗i < c2
3 if c2 ≤ Y ∗i < c3
4 if Y ∗i ≥ c3
where c1, c2 and c3 are the cut-off points of the ordered probit model.
In order to identify the parameters of the ordinal response regression model and
the predicted probabilities, we impose the following normalisations: 1) we assume that
V ar(i) = 1 and cs > cs−1 to preserve positive probabilities; 2) we eliminate the constant
term α0. This is because the identification of the model requires us to either drop the
intercept or fix one cut-off point. As a result of the absence of the constant term, the
actual cut-off points are left shifted by α0; and finally, 3) we further force the cut-off point
c1 to be zero, which allows us to compute the probabilities of an individual output Yi
being considered to be of quality 4*, 3*, 2* or 1*. Therefore, for an individual output Yi
published at journal k (i.e. Di,k = 1 and Di,−k = 0), the probabilities of being ranked as
4*, 3*, 2* or 1* can be expressed as:
Pr(Yi = s) = Φ(cs − β′Di)− Φ(cs−1 − β′Di)
= Φ(cs − βk)− Φ(cs−1 − βk) for s = 4∗, 3∗, 2∗, 1∗ (..)
where c0 = −∞, c1 = 0 and c4 = ∞; Φ(.) indicates the cumulative distribution function
of the standard Normal distribution. In addition, it is common to apply GPA scores to
epitomise the REF assessment results of each institution (see for example, the REF 2014
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Table of Excellence by Times Higher Education (Jump, 2014) ). Hence, we predict the
GPA score of each institution j by:
ĜPAj :=
nj∑
i=1
4∑
s=1
Pˆr(Yi = s)× s
and similarly the predicted GPA score to represent the perception of quality for each
journal k can be written as:
ĜPAk :=
1
4
4∑
s=1
Pˆr(Yi = s|Di,k = 1, Di,−k = 0)× s
1.2.2 Exchange Probabilities to Predict Censored Outcomes
In our ordered probit model the actual ordinal response Y is, however, unobservable since
the REF 2014 published data does not tell us the detailed classification of each submission.
Instead, the REF provides aggregate statistics for submissions that meet the REF quality
criteria, at the level of the institution (See Table 1.1). Algebraically, we are able to produce
an aggregate measure for the total number of outputs Tjs in each quality class s, (s =
1, 2, 3, 4) at each institution j, (j = 1, ..., J):
Tjs :=
nj∑
i=1
I(Yi = s) for s = 4, 3, 2, 1 (..)
where nj is the total number of submissions from the institution j.
Our proposed Gibbs step for sampling Y is built upon observable aggregate measures
Tjs within the ordered probit regression framework, and provides an effective recovery of
the disaggregate outcomes. Since we already know the aggregate counts of the outcome, we
need make sure that the recovered disaggregate outcomes Y will not violate these aggregate
counts Tjs. Motivated by this rule, we propose the “exchange of probabilities” method to
sample Y : given the current state of θ = (β, c) and Y , we swap every two distinct values of
Yi and Yl in the same the institution (i.e. yi and yl, where i 6= l), and then assign yi and yl
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to the configuration with the highest posterior probability. Importantly, because the values
can only be swapped within the same institution, the observable aggregate measures Tjs
for all j and all s will not be changed. More specifically, we consider each output Yi, and
randomly pick another output Yl from the same institution. In doing so, we obtain two
configurations:
Pr(Yi = yi, Yl = yl|θ) and Pr(Yi = yl, Yl = yi|θ) (..)
and the joint probability of submissions Yi and Yl which are equal to their current values:
Pr(Yi = yi, Yl = yl|θ) = Pr(Yi = yi|θ) Pr(Yl = yl|θ)
=
(
Φ(cyi − β′Di)− Φ(cyi−1 − β′Di)
)
×
(
Φ(cyl − β′Dl)− Φ(cyl−1 − β′Dl)
)
(..)
and the joint probability that Yi and Yl exchange their values is:6
Pr(Yi = yl, Yl = yi|θ) = Pr(Yi = yl|θ) Pr(Yl = yi|θ)
=
(
Φ(cyl − β′Di)− Φ(cyl−1 − β′Di)
)
×
(
Φ(cyi − β′Dl)− Φ(cyi−1 − β′Dl)
)
(..)
Once the above two configurations have been computed, the Gibbs step of sampling
6The latent variable Y ∗ can be integrated out by:
f(Yi|θ) =
∫
f(Yi, Y
∗
i |θ)dY ∗i
=
∫
Pr(Yi|Y ∗i , θ)fN (Y ∗i |θ)dY ∗i
=
∫
I(cYi−1 < Y
∗
i ≤ cYi)fN (Y ∗i |θ)dY ∗i
= FN (cYi |β′Di, 1)− FN (cYi−1|β′Di, 1)
= Φ(cYi − β′Di)− Φ(cYi−1 − β′Di)
where fN and Φ refer to the standard Normal density and its distribution function, respectively.
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Yi can be formulated.7 First, given the current state of θ = (β, c), we randomly pick
two indices i and l from the same institution j. Second, we compute two configurations
according to Equation .. and ... Third, we normalise two configurations and compute
the probability of swapping their values, i.e.:
Pil := Pr(Yi = yl, Yl = yi|θ)
Pr(Yi = yi, Yl = yl|θ) + Pr(Yi = yl, Yl = yi|θ) (..)
Finally, yi and yl swap values with a probability Pil, and both stay at their current values
otherwise. In each Gibbs sampling iteration, we perform the above steps to exchange the
probabilities for every pair of the observations until all have been considered.
In this model, the outcome values of submissions can be exchanged based on their poste-
rior probabilities in ways that minimise the risk of incorrect assignments. The probabilistic
exchange is performed for submissions from the same department j, which guarantees that
the total count Tjs is not violated. One might want to exchange more values at one time;
however, this could be computationally costly as it increases the number of configurations
geometrically. In Section 1.3.1 we utilise an artificial dataset to demonstrate the validity
of this algorithm.
1.2.3 Separation Problem and Prior Specification
Monotonic Likelihood Function
In a generalised linear model, such as a probit or logit regression, the separation problem
often arises when the corresponding outcome observations of the covariates are perfectly
or nearly perfectly determined. This problem could be more likely to occur in our ordinal
regression specification where many journal dummies are simultaneously present. Indeed,
a by-product of our algorithm for exchanging probabilities is the separation problem. For
instance, after a few MCMC iterations with the exchange of probabilities, the journal
dummy for Econometrica could have all values of 4 in the LHS variable. The separation
results in a monotonic likelihood function, and, as a consequence, the normal maximum
7Section 1.2.5 carefully summarises the Gibbs sampling scheme for our model.
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likelihood estimator will be either infinitely large or infinitely small.8 In the Bayesian
context, if one chooses a flat prior, then a very large (or very small) candidate parameter
would be very easy to be accepted by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Additionally,
the separation could be more of a concern in our case, in which a large number of journal
indicators are included.
An important piece of Bayesian literature by Firth (1993) proposes a solution to correct
the well-known small sample bias from the maximum likelihood estimator for generalised
linear models. In a Bayesian interpretation, this is known as the Jeffreys prior. One benefit
of this method is that it can be adopted to address the separation problem in a logit model.
However, based on our attempts, the Jeffreys prior induces the convergence problem when
dealing with the separation problem. Gelman et al. (2008) has also encountered the same
convergence problem. In our ordered probit set-up, the Jeffreys prior could actually be
more computationally complicated compared to that of a simple binary logit model, and
the MCMC updating will be inefficient in practice.
Alternatively, Gelman et al. (2008) put forward the Cauchy prior with scale 4 to handle
the separation issue in a binary logit model. They then provide evidence on cross-validation
to support this prior. Motivated by this idea, we extend the Cauchy prior to an ordered
probit model with censored outcomes. One particular concern is then to select a prior that
can produce proper predicted probabilities and marginal effects rather than focusing solely
on model parameters (i.e. β and c).
1.2.4 Cauchy Prior with Scale 10
To find a suitable prior distribution for our model, we reconcile two crucial points: 1)
whether the prior is strong enough to correct the monotonicity of the likelihood in the
presence of perfectly determined covariates; and 2) whether the prior is diffuse enough so
that it has the smallest impact on the resulting posterior parameters of both separated and
non-separated covariates, and can thus deliver proper predicted probabilities and marginal
8Some popular statistical packages, such as R and Stata, will randomly generate a large point estimator
of perfectly determined covariates as well as wide confidence intervals.
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effects.
In a probit model with a standard normal error term, the coefficient on a dummy
variable or a normalised continuous variable is most likely to fall within the range of [-3, 3]
(i.e. within three standard deviations of the standard normal distribution). In the presence
of the separation, the coefficient may become either infinitely large or small, and at the
same time the predicted probabilities for any non-zero value of the separated covariate
and its marginal effects will be at their extreme values. However, since the quantities of
interest in most probit or logit regressions are the predicted probabilities and marginal
effects, rather than the parameters of the regression model,9 in fact, we only need to
ensure that the predicted probabilities for any non-zero value of the separated covariate
and its marginal effects are extremely large or small. To achieve this, it is important to set
a suitably large or small (but not necessarily infinite) parameters of the regression model
(say, eight for a dummy variable in a binary probit scale) so as to ensure that the predicted
probabilities attain their extreme values. This is especially important for an ordered probit
model as a very large or small the regression model parameters will also change the cut-off
point, and the predicted probabilities for other non-separated variables will deviate from
their actual values as a consequence.
Therefore, we consider a normal prior with scale 10 for parameters of our ordered
probit regression model, which permits the parameter of the separated dummy to reach
±8 (refer to the red curve in Figure 1.1), and the corresponding predicted probabilities
to be sufficiently large or small. A further advantage of this prior is that it has a very
small influence on the posterior parameters of the non-separated covariates. As noted
by Koop et al. (2007), the normal prior with scale 10 can generally be regarded as a
non-informative prior on linear regression parameters. Moreover, our application might
unfortunately include many separated covariates. To be on safe ground, we adopt the
Cauchy prior with scale 10, which has fatter tails than the N (0, 10) prior (see the red
curve in Figure 1.1), to enhance the likelihood that the predicted probabilities for any
non-zero value of the separated covariate and its marginal effects successfully reach their
9Except that one is interested in the log-odds ratio of a logit model, e.g. in epidemiological studies.
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extremes. It is worthwhile to mention that alternative prior distributions, for example the
student’s t distribution with small degrees of freedom and a large scale, might function
similarly. However, we find that the Cauchy prior with scale 10 behaves relatively better in
terms of stability. In the next section, we provide supportive evidence on the choice of the
Cauchy prior by using cross-validation10 to examine models with different prior parameters
and different link functions.
1.2.5 Sampling from Posterior Densities
Before starting the MCMC iterations, we need to initialise the values of Yi as we do not
observe the outcome Y (0)i in reality. We randomly generate Y
(0)
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} in ways such
that they are consistent with the actual numbers of aggregate submissions meeting each
quality standard (i.e. Tjs =
∑nj
i=1 I(Yi = s), for s = 1, 2, 3, 4). This step can be thought
of as an additional initialisation stage of the MCMC scheme. Hence, to sample from the
posterior, the Gibbs cycle operates on the variables (β, c, Y ) as follows.
Sampling Model Parameters θ = (β, c)′ Given y
Given the current state of y, which is obtained from the exchange of probabilities, the
target distribution of the parameters θ = (β, c)′ after integrating out the latent y∗ is:
f(θ|y) ∝
( J∏
j
nj∏
i
f(yi|θ)
)
p(θ|θ0) (..)
where f(yi|θ) = Φ(cyi−β′Di)−Φ(cyi−1−β′Di) and p(θ|θ0) is the Cauchy prior for param-
eters. θ0 consists of the mean and the scale hyperparameters. The mean hyperparameters
is fixed at zero, and the scale hyperparameters is 10 for each β and 100 for each cut-off
point.
A Metropolis-Hastings sampler with the Laplace approximation is applied to facilitate
the sampling (a similar implementation can be seen from Pitt et al. (2006)). We use a
multivariate t-distribution Tv(θˆ, V ) as our proposal distribution in which the mean θˆ is a
10Similarly, Gelman et al. (2008) use cross-validation for prior parameters in a binary logit model.
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mode of the log-likelihood and the scale V is the negative inverse of the second derivative,
which can be obtained by a Newton or quasi-Newton procedure. The degrees of freedom
v are generally chosen at around six to ensure that the proposal density dominates the
target in the tails. Then the acceptance probability of candidate θ′ ∼ Tv(θˆ, V ) is:
αθ = min
{
1,
f(θ′|x)Tv(θ|θˆ, V )
f(θ|x)Tv(θ′|θˆ, V )
}
(..)
Hence, with probability αθ, we take θ = θ′ and otherwise θ stays at current values.
In practice, we utilise the block MCMC to sample β and c separately, which has been
found to have a better acceptance rate than that of the case in which they are sampled
together. The cut-off points c(s) = (c(s)2 , c
(s)
3 )
′ are sampled as in a single block. For β,
we randomly permutate their order and randomly stratify them into blocks, each of which
contains two to six elements, for every iteration. Such block sampling allows us to attain
a higher acceptance rate in the Metropolis-Hasting step, as well as allows correlations
between the parameters.
Sampling Censored Outcome Variable Y Given θ
Now we specifically illustrate the steps to sample the individual outcome Y using the
approach described in Section 1.2.2. According to the current state of θ = (β, c)′, two
indices i and l are randomly picked from the same institution j. We subsequently compute
two configurations:
Pr(Yi = yi, Yl = yl|θ) and Pr(Yi = yl, Yl = yi|θ) (..)
which is then normalised to compute the probability of exchanging values:
Pil := Pr(Yi = yl, Yl = yi|θ)
Pr(Yi = yi, Yl = yl|θ) + Pr(Yi = yl, Yl = yi|θ) (..)
Therefore, yi and yl swap values with a probability Pil, and both stay at their current
values otherwise. In each of the Gibbs sampling iterations, we perform the above steps to
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exchange the probabilities for every pair of the observations until all have been swept.
1.3 Verification of Algorithm
The objective of this section is to verify our proposed algorithm from different aspects.
The first verification is based on an artificial data that is designed to mimic the real
data structure. It demonstrates that our model works properly, and the estimated model
parameters (β and c) are very close to their benchmark values. Table A.3 and Figure A.1
in the Appendix provide more details of this simulation.
The remaining three verifications we present here are respectively used to 1) verify the
rationale for the probability exchange algorithm using true data and simulation data; 2)
consider the case in which journal dummies have only a few values of one; and 3) choose
proper models and prior hyperparameters by cross-validation.
1.3.1 Rationale for Exchange of Probabilities
Predict the Actual GPA Scores
First we show that the exchange of probabilities algorithm can effectively recover the under-
lying unobservable individual outcomes in real-life applications, by comparing the observed
actual GPA scores of each Economics department with our predicted values (Figure 1.2).
The technical details for the calculation of actual GPAs, predicted GPAs, and interval
estimates are presented in Appendix A.3.
The sub-plot (1) reveals that the predicted GPA scores remain reasonably close to the
true GPA scores along the 45 degree reference line. The two scores are highly correlated
as reflected by the correlation coefficient of 0.958. We then fit a regression line of the
true scores on the predicted scores with an intercept. The R2 coefficient is 0.917, and the
estimated slope is 1.152 (se=0.058), reflecting the fact that the predicted GPA scores are
fairly close to the actual ones. The 95% confidence intervals of the fitted regression line,
which almost cover the 45 degree reference line, reassure us that the predicted GPAs and
the true GPAs are very similar on average. Sub-plots (2)-(4) of 1.2 for the GPA proportions
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of 4’s, 3’s and 2’s tell pretty much the same story. In the empirical results in Section 1.4,
we present further investigation into the institutional effects.
The Role of Aggregate Information
The basic idea behind the exchange of probabilities lies in the aggregate information avail-
able in the REF data. We intuitively believe that this step is likely to induce a more
accurate retrieval of the outcomes provided that more aggregate information is available.
Thus it is interesting to understand how strong the aggregate information should be in
order for us to obtain an accurate recovery and credible estimation results. To illustrate
this, suppose that we have aggregate information of about 2,600 individual submissions
from 28 institutions, we want to ask: given the information on these 28 institutions, how
will our method behave (better or worse) if there are more or fewer individual submissions?
To answer this question, we perform the first simulation whilst relying on an artificial
dataset generated by following the data structure of the 2014 REF Economics and Econo-
metrics sub-panel. To be more precise, we define 28 artificial institutions, each of which
has the same proportion of submissions that are considered to be of quality 4,* 3*, 2*
and 1* as they have in the real data. The values of the LHS outcomes are then simulated
to be consistent with the actual numbers of the aggregate proportions for each of the 28
economics departments, as informed by the REF data. We employ four independent co-
variates in the process of data generation: x1 and x2 are Gaussian covariates with a unit
variance, and x3 and x4 are Bernoulli variables with a probability 0.3 of being one. The
actual parameters are 0.8, -0.8, 1.4 and -1.4, respectively. To assess the performance of
the algorithm with different sample sizes, we generate artificial datasets with sample sizes
500, 1,500, 2,600, 3,500, 4,500 and 5,000, each repeated four times.
The so-called Hamming loss is utilised to evaluate the extent to which our method for
exchanging probabilities can restore the categorical outcome variables. The Hamming loss
statistic can be written as:
LHamming(Y, Yˆ ) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Yi 6= Yˆi) (..)
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where Y denotes the actual outcome and Yˆ denotes the predicted outcome. In essence,
the Hamming loss measures whether the outcome Y can be exactly retrieved exactly. It is
suitable for dummy or nominal outcomes that can be specified as true or false.
Figure 1.3 presents the MCMC trace plots of the Hamming loss for selected sample
sizes 500, 1,500, 2,600 and 5,000. The Hamming loss has randomly assigned initial values
of about 0.75, which can be viewed as the benchmark values. The pattern of the two trace
plots reveals that, for all sample sizes, the Hamming loss converges from its benchmark
values to the steady state in fewer than 1,000 iterations, suggesting that our algorithm, built
on the Metropolis-Hastings sampler, is able to efficiently retrieve the outcome variables.
The Hamming loss has the largest number (about 0.07) when the sample size is 500,
which implies that approximately 93 percent of the outcome values are exactly recovered.
When there are 2,600 submissions, the same number of submissions as in the real data, the
Hamming loss (0.20) suggests that roughly 80 percent of the total outcomes are successfully
predicted. Reassuringly, this is a notably high recovery rate relative to the benchmark
Hamming loss score (i.e., 0.75 for the outcome with 4 categories). As the Hamming loss
only considers exact recovery cases, we see that it clearly gets larger as the sample size
increases.
1.3.2 Journal Dummies with Only Few Values of One
Another challenge to our method arises when many dummy variables, of which only very
few have the value one, are included (i.e., journal dummy variables have only a few sub-
missions). Consider a toy example with 22 observations and two journal dummy variables:
Journal A and Journal B. Assume that Journal A has two submissions to the REF and
Journal B has 20. Also assume that each submission has a 50 percent chance of being clas-
sified as 4* and a 50 percent chance to be classified as 1*. Therefore, there are two extreme
cases for both journals—all submissions are judged as 4* and all submissions are judged
as 1*. In the former (latter) case, the coefficients on the journal dummies will be at their
largest (smallest) values. All submissions from Journal A have a 0.502 = 0.25 probability
of having the quality standard 4* or 1*, while all submissions from Journal B have only a
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0.5020 = 9.5×10−6% probability of being classified as 4* or 1*. This suggests that Journal
A, which has a smaller number of submissions, has an exponentially higher probability to
attain the extreme value, and thus its sampled coefficient will be much wavier than that
of Journal B.
Furthermore, if a large fraction of submissions is from journals with only a few submis-
sions, the fluctuations of the sampled coefficients will render waving sampled cut-off points
accordingly. Additionally, the sampled coefficients on other journal dummy variables will
deviate according to the change of the cut-off points.
We now exploit an artificial dataset to illustrate the aforementioned points. To gen-
erate LHS outcome variables, we implement the same procedure as in simulation one and
in the previous subsection. The resulting sample size is 2,600, indicating 2,600 submis-
sions. We define six artificial, mutually exclusive journal dummy variables, each of which
has 100 submissions. We then generate a series of mutually exclusive dummies for small
submissions. A total of eight designs are examined:
Design 1 : There is no journals with less submissions.
Design 2 : 5% of the total submissions are from journals with 10 submissions.
Design 3 : 10% of the total submissions are from journals with 10 submissions.
Design 4 : 15% of the total submissions are from journals with 10 submissions.
Design 5 : 20% of the total submissions are from journals with 10 submissions.
Design 6 : 20% of the total submissions are from journals with 20 submissions.
Design 7 : 20% of the total submissions are from journals with 40 submissions.
Design 8 : 20% of the total submissions are from journals with 80 submissions.
Table 1.2 reports the posterior means and the standard deviations for the aforemen-
tioned designs. In general, the posterior means of all these designs, presented in columns
(4)-(11), are close to the benchmark estimates by the maximum likelihood or MCMC,
given that the true Y is known (columns (2)-(3)). In columns (4)-(8) we observe that, as
the proportion of journals with 10 submissions rises from zero percent to 20 percent, the
posterior means of the parameters of journals with 100 submissions differ more significantly
from their benchmark values. Columns (8)-(11) correspond to the results of designs 5-8.
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The coefficient estimates suggest that, when conditioning on 20 percent of total submis-
sions and when the number of submissions in each journal increases (from 10 to 80), the
posterior means become much closer to the benchmark values. However, there is no sig-
nificant difference in the posterior standard deviations of β. Regarding the cut-off points,
we observe a similar pattern in the results. In addition, the posterior standard deviations
of the cut-off points go larger from design 4 to design 8, but turn smaller from design 8 to
design 11.
Crucially for the analysis, the effects of main interest pertain to the predicted prob-
abilities for each journal dummy. Interestingly, the posterior probabilities, reported in
Table 1.3, show that there is almost no significant difference in terms of the probabilities
of journals with 100 submissions, for all eight designs. We do not find a sound analytical
justification for this. One possible explanation is that although the journals with small
submissions fluctuate in both β and c, the changes in β and c are in the same direction
and eventually offset each other in the equation that calculates the probabilities (Equation
..). In summary, there are two implications for the inclusion of journal dummies with
a small number of submissions. First, when a large proportion of total submissions comes
from journals with only a few submissions (e.g. 10 submissions), the sampled cut-off points
become waving and the posterior means of the parameters of other journal dummies differ
significantly from their benchmark values. Second, it seems that this does not lead to any
significant difference in the probabilities of these journal dummies because the fluctuations
can cancel each other out.
1.3.3 Cross-validation
The last simulation is to explore a suitable prior distribution and a model link function
(i.e., a probit or logit) for our empirical applications. We use five-fold cross-validation to
evaluate the model fitness under different specifications. The idea of the cross-validation
originates from an interesting line of research on machine learning, which has commonly
been used to evaluate model predictions. Here we implement a five-fold cross-validation—
the same number of folds used in Gelman et al. (2008)—for a binary logit model. In
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particular, we randomly split the data into five sub-samples of equal size. Four out of the
five sub-samples are used as training data, and the remaining sub-sample as validation
data. In the ordered probit model we use the parameters estimated by the training data
to predict the outcome in the validation data. We focus on two statistics to examine the
quality of our predictions. The first is the Brier score loss (Brier, 1950), defined as the
mean square error from models with dichotomous outcomes (e.g. Bernhardt et al. (2016)
applied Brier score loss for the ordered probit model):
Bi,loss :=
4∑
s=1
(I(Yi = s)− Pr(Yi = s))2 (..)
The second statistic refers to the log loss, which is defined on the estimated probabilities
rather than the discrete predictions. It can be written as a negative log-likelihood:
Li,loss := −
4∑
s=1
I(Yi = s) log Pr(Yi = s) (..)
The process above is rotated for all five sub-samples so that each observation will be
used in the validation. We repeat the cross-validation procedure for different combinations
of the link functions, scales and degrees of freedom of the student’s t prior.
It is important to note that the focus of this subsection is not on the recovery of out-
comes. Therefore, we fix the outcome variables Y at their initial assignments, following
Hole (2015). Specifically, the values of Y are simulated according to the predicted prob-
abilities for each economics journal that meets the REF criteria as listed in Table A1 in
Hole (2015). We then define two different sets of journal dummy variables (65 dummies
and 37 dummies) which coincide with the specifications explored in the next section.
The average Brier score loss and average log loss are plotted in Figure 1.4-1.5. For
the probit model, both figures imply that, when the scale is greater than about nine,
the student’s priors (no matter the scale parameter) have similarly small Brier score and
log losses under the probit specification. We find that the Cauchy prior (labelled as the t
distribution with degrees of freedom one) seems to have the lowest Brier score and log losses
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for all scale parameters. In general, the probit model appears to show lower loss statistics
than the logit model does. From the four subplots in Figure 1.4-1.5, it is still difficult to
say which prior specification is predominantly good. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that
the probit model fits our empirical work better than the logit model, and that the Cauchy
prior with a scale around 10 under the ordered probit set-up is a consistently better choice.
1.4 Empirical Results and Analysis
1.4.1 Background and Data
We draw large scale data from the 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF) to facilitate
the empirical analysis of journal perceptions.11 The REF is a framework for assessing re-
search quality and impact in UK Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), last conducted by
the UK government in 2014.12 It aims to support a dynamic and competitive UK research
environment and to provide information for academic and public use. The quality of each
submitted research output (e.g. journal article, working paper, monograph, or book chap-
ter) published between January 2008 and December 2013 was assessed by peer reviewers
from 36 expert sub-panels in different research areas. The outcome was in the form of
a quality profile, which includes one of the following classifications: “world leading” (4*),
“internationally excellent” (3*), “recognised internationally” (2*), “recognised nationally”
(1*), and “unclassified”.13 Our algorithm effectively merges the last two categories as they
both indicate poor quality of the work.
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics for 2,600 submissions to the REF Economics
and Econometrics sub-panel at the level of the institution. In the 2014 exercise, the largest
submission to the Economics and Econometrics unit came from the University of Oxford,
which submitted 242 research outputs, and the smallest came from the University of East
11All data is publicly available from the REF official website: http://results.ref.ac.uk/.
12The REF replaced the previous Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) in 2008. It was carried out
jointly by four authorities: the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), the Scottish
Funding Council (SFC), the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW) and the Department
for Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland (DEL).
13The work in the unclassified category has the quality that falls below 1* or does not meet the published
standard for the purpose of this assessment.
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Anglia, which submitted only 49. The overall distribution of the average quality increases
from 3.65 percent in 1*, to 20.19 percent in 2*, to 48.65 percent in 3*, and then decreases
to 27.5 percent in 4*. This suggests that a large number of research outputs in economics
are perceived to be of high quality by members and assessors.
Table A.1 summarises, at the journal level, the number of submissions for all economics
outputs to the Economics and Econometrics sub-panel and to the Business and Manage-
ment Studies sub-panel, presented respectively in column (2) and (3). In this paper, we
primarily focus on the perception of economics journals by the Economics and Econo-
metrics sub-panel. We look at the Business and Management Studies sub-panel purely
for comparison purposes. Based on the Panel Criteria and Working Methods for REF
2014, the REF exercise operated a few calibration exercises to ensure the consistency of
assessment across the sub-panels, including cross-referral process, introduction of a mem-
ber sitting in both sub-panels, and justifications by sub-panel chairs. Moreover, Pidd and
Broadbent (2015) disclosed more details about the Business and Management Studies sub-
panel14. In reality, the Business and Management Studies sub-panel has passed on more
than 1300 economics research outputs to the Economics and Econometrics sub-panel for
the cross-referral. Subsequently, it assigned final grades to these economics submissions
according to the recommended scores they received from the Economics and Econometrics
sub-panel.
However, publicly available information on the REF 2014 did not explicitly indicates
that which outputs should be considered as “economics” outputs, nor did it clearly reveal
to the public that how the “economics” outputs had been defined by the Business and
Management studies sub-panel. Column 2 of Table A.1 lists the 3,055 outputs from the
Business and Management Studies sub-panel being published in the same journals that
outputs from the Economics and Econometrics sub-panel were also published. We cannot
separate out the cross-referred outputs from these 3,055 outputs. Therefore, outputs pub-
lished at economics journals from the Business and Management Studies sub-panel might
14 Pidd and Broadbent (2015) is a paper written by the chair and the deputy chair of the Business and
Management Studies sub-panel for the REF 2014 exercise, on behalf of this sub-panel.
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contain both cross-referred and independent-referred outputs.
Besides, the first column of Table A.1 shows that the 2014 SJR ranking15 for each eco-
nomics journal, which serves two important roles. Firstly, it provides useful benchmarking
information on the journal ranking for comparison purposes. Secondly, in later analysis,
we will aggregate journals with small submissions into several groups according to their
positions in the SJR ranking.
1.4.2 Results: Economics and Econometrics Sub-panel
First we present results for journals with at least 20 submissions to avoid any potential
bias caused by journals with small submissions, as discussed in Section 1.3.2. We then
incorporate dummy variables for journals with only 10 to 20 submissions, and reconcile
the two results.
Journals with more than 20 submissions
We start with a description of the estimated results for journals with more than 20 submis-
sions, as summarised in Table 1.4-1.5 and Figure 1.6. In Table 1.5 we report the number of
submissions to each journal (column (1)), the corresponding SJR ranking in 2014 for each
journal (column (2)), the respective probability of being ranked as 4*/3*/2*/1* (columns
(3)-(10)), and the average score by weighting the four predictive rankings (columns (11)-
(12)). Unsurprisingly, the five top-ranked journals are AER, Econometrica, REStud, QJE,
and JME.16 Within the top five, the AER (GPA score 3.972), Econometrica (GPA score
3.971) and REStud (GPA score 3.9721) are clearly distinguishable from the remaining two,
with more than a 90 percent chance of making it into rank 4* but a zero probability of
being ranked as 2* or 1*. Reassuringly, the regression model parameters (β and c) and the
associated predicted probabilities exhibit narrow MCMC standard deviations.
15 The SJR (SCImago Journal Rank), which is a measure of the scientific influence of journals that
account, ranks scientific journals of 27 main subject areas and 313 specific subject categories, based on
the citation data drawn from over 21,500 titles and from more than 5,000 international publishers. More
details of the SJR indicator can be found at SCImago (2007).
16To interpret results neatly, some of the generally recognisable economics journals are abbreviated. For
example, the American Economic Review is abbreviated as AER, and the Journal of Political Economy as
JPE. The full list of abbreviations can be found in Table A.2 of the Appendix.
26
Chapter B §1.4. Empirical Results and Analysis
The journals ranked sixth through to tenth are JEEA, JPE, Journal of Econometrics,
JDE, and JIE, with the GPA socre ranging from 3.500 for the JIE to 3.784 for the JEEA.
Contrary to expectations, the JPE (GPA score 3.716) appears to have a relatively low
rank. One possible explanation lies in the fact that this journal has the smallest number
of submissions (22) in this model specification, and thus may not be very representative.
A similar case is observed for the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, whose
number of submission is only 24, resulting in a wide MCMC standard deviation. The EJ
is number 11, the JPubE number 12, the JAE number 13, the REStat number 14 and
the JET number 15. The GPA score ranges from 3.045 for the JET to 3.339 for the EJ.
Among the top-16 to 20, there is one finance journal (JMCB) and four economics journals
(IER, Games and Economic Behaviour, EER, and Economic Theory). The weighted mean
quality ratings are between 2.797 and 2.991.
From the 20th-ranked journal on down, the Economics Letters is ranked the lowest,
perhaps due to its nature of being a supplement to the specialist literature by providing
quick dissemination and accessibility (as described on its official webpage at Elsevier17).
Most prominently, the estimates indicate that “other journals” with higher ranks ac-
cording to the SJR are also ranked unambiguously higher in our model. With regard to
the three categories at the bottom, we see that unpublished papers and other types of
unpublished work (GPA score 3.409) have a rank between the JIE and the EJ, while book
chapters (GPA score 3.219) are ranked between the JAE and the REStat. Other articles
(GPA score 1.630) are perceived the least favourably. In addition, it is important to note
that the overall pattern of the rankings generated by our algorithm is generally consistent
with that of the SJR 2014.
Journals with 10-20 submissions
Turning to journals with 10-20 submissions, some interesting results emerge from Table
1.6. First, several journals introduced in recent years dominate at the top. For instance,
the Quantitative Economics, which began publishing in 2009, is ranked first in this list,
17The website of the Economics Letters is at: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economics-letters.
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with the highest probability of being perceived to be of 4* quality (0.909) and the highest
GPA score at 3.909. Another successful newcomer is the American Economic journal series,
which also started in 2009, and occupies three out of the five top positions. Specifically, the
AEJ: Economic Policy, Microeconomics, and Applied Economics have, respectively, 87.6
percent, 59.0 percent, and 51.1 percent chances of being considered to be of the highest
standard. Second, differences in journal quality perceptions appear to exist across different
fields, and our algorithm seems to rank the qualitative and applied journals more highly.
A notable example is given by the journals from economic history, such as the Journal of
Economic History and the Explorations in Economic History, which are ranked at second
and seventh, respectively. Among those more theoretical journals, however, the rankings
decline sharply (e.g. Journal of Mathematical Economics, AEJ: Macroeconomics, and
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics).
The second panel of the table displays the results for journals with more than 20
submissions after adding journals with 10-20 submissions to the estimation. The posterior
predicted probabilities in the second panel of Table 1.6 are very similar to the ones in
Table 1.4, which echoes our simulation evidence (Section 1.3.2) that journals with fewer
submissions could have a large impact on the posterior of other parameters of the regression
but have a limited impact on the resulting predicted probabilities. Compared with the
previous results in Table 1.4, a great deal of the journals are consistently ranked after
accounting for observations with 10-20 submissions. The stability of the ranking is apparent
at the very top of the ranking—the top five journals (AER, Econometrica, REStud, QJE,
and JME) are exactly the same for the two samples. We note an erratic behaviour of the
ranking for a small number of journals, but the fluctuations in journal ranks are mostly
within adjacent categories. For instance, the JPE moves upward by just one category from
number seven to number six, while the JEEA moves downward by two categories from
number six to number eight.
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Institutional Fixed Effects
Furthermore, we re-investigate Figure 1.2 to explore whether there are institutional effects
on the REF 2014 perception. Encouragingly, we find that the predicted and the true
GPA scores are almost identical for institutions with mid-ranged GPA scores, such as
Edinburgh, Essex, Glasgow, Leicester, and Manchester. Interestingly, institutions with
higher GPA scores perform better than the model predicts (i.e., UCL, Cambridge, Warwick,
and Oxford), whereas institutions with lower GPA scores perform worse than the model
predicts (i.e., Brunel, Kent, and Aberdeen).
The evidence above implies the existence of institutional fixed effects on journal quality
perception by the REF. In other words, given a particular type of submission or publication
at the same journal, outputs from recognisably prestigious Economics departments such
as those of UCL, Cambridge, Warwick, and Oxford would have a greater chance of being
rated highly by the REF panel. Conversely, submissions from less prestigious Economics
departments at institutions such as Brunel, Kent, and Aberdeen would receive a poor
perception by the REF. For instance, a working paper from Oxford is more likely to attain
a higher REF criteria than one from Kent; or an EJ publication from UCL is more likely
to be rated as having good quality than the same publication from Brunel.
1.4.3 Results: Economics Journals in Business and Management Stud-
ies Sub-panel
Next we examine how our model predicts the perception of quality for economics journals
by the REF Business and Management Studies sub-panel. We focus on those typical
economics journals with more than 10 submissions. According to the results in Table 1.7
and Figure 1.7, we see that as the proportion of economics journals with 10-20 submissions
is relatively small (220 out of a total of 12,171 submissions from 98 institutions), the MCMC
sampled cut-off points are persistent and strongly mixing (Figure A.5 in Appendix), which
reconciles our demonstration in Section 1.3.2 that a very small subset of the sample from
journals with small submissions will not make cut-off points further waving.
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The REStud has the highest ranking, followed by the JIE and the JME (with respective
weighted average quality ratings being 3.964, 3.943, and 3.934). The top general interest
economics journals (i.e. AER and REStud) still maintain a high perception in the Business
and Management Studies sub-panel. Besides, a comparison of the results of economics
journals perceived by the Business and Management Studies sub-panel (Table 1.7) with
similar results provided by the Economics and Econometrics sub-panel (Table 1.4 and Table
1.6) suggests that the Business and Management Studies assessment unit holds a better
perception concerning the quality of economics journals. For example, the JET is estimated
to have the probability of 0.156 being ranked as 4* in the Economics and Econometrics
sub-panel, while the estimated probability is 0.930 here. Similarly, the weighted average
quality rating for Games and Economic Behaviour was 2.882 before but became 3.863 now.
Significant upward movements are also observed for the EJ, Journal of Health Economics,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, among others. Taken as a whole, this indicates
that the perception of economics journal quality is significantly higher in the Business and
Management Studies sub-panels.
Since the REF 2014 took a few measures to ensure the consistency of judgement across
various sub-panels as mentioned in Section 1.4.1, one possible explanation of the difference
in the results is that the overall quality of the economics submissions produced in the
Business and Management sub-panel is generally higher than that in the Economics and
Econometrics sub-panel.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper we aim to investigate how the REF 2014 perceives journals, with a particular
interest in the economics journals. We began by highlighting the problem that we cannot
observe the outcome that how each individual output admitted by the REF 2014 exercise
is perceived, but we do know the aggregate counts/proportions of how many submissions
from each institution meet the REF 2014 criteria. We pursue this idea by working within
the framework of ordered probit regression, and propose a new approach to sample the
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unobservable outcomes. A common concern with a probit or logit model relates to the
separation problem. We overcome this potential issue by incorporating a diffused prior
to our proposed model—the Cauchy distribution with scale 10. We develop an efficient
MCMC scheme to sample parameters of the ordinal response regression model, as well as
the outcome variable. We verify the algorithm on various simulations with an artificial
dataset that mimics the data structure of the REF 2014.
Our empirical evidence mainly focuses on the economics journals’ submissions and
other types of submissions to the Economics and Econometrics sub-panel. Moreover, we
also checked the Business and Management Studies sub-panel to investigate whether sub-
missions from same economics journals would have been treated differently in another REF
sub-panels.
In addition, the methodology of this paper can easily be extended to any generalised
linear regression models, and could serve as a solution to estimate the effect in the case
that the outcome is only available as aggregate information for sub-groups.
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Figure 1.1: Densities of the Standard Normal, N (0, 102) and Cauchy(0, 10)
Note.—The blue line refers to the density of the standard normal distribution (Probit link).
The green line refers to he density of zero mean normal with scale 10.
The Red line refers to the zero mean Cauchy distribution with scale 10.
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Figure 1.2: Predicted and True GPA Score of Each Institution by REF Eco-
nomics and Econometrics Panel
Note.—The results are obtained by 20,000 iterations after 3000 burn-in periods of the proposed MCMC algo-
rithm base on data from the REF 2014 Economics and Econometrics Assessment Unit. Sub-plot (1) lists the
number of submission of each journal. Sub-plots (2)-(4) reflect the proportions 4’s, 3’s and 2’s of the GPA score.
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Figure 1.3: Trace Plots of the Average Hamming Loss by Different Sample
Sizes – Simulation Data
Note.—Each curve represents the Hamming loss by averaging over four instances of independent chains, each
of which is based on a randomly generated sample according to the data generating process defined in the text.
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Figure 1.4: Average Brier Score Loss and Log Loss for Different Scales
and Degrees of Freedom of the Student-T Prior and for Different Link
Functions of the Ordered Response Model – Five-fold Cross-Validation (65
covariates)
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Figure 1.5: Average Brier Score Loss and Log Loss for Different Scales
and Degrees of Freedom of the Student-T Prior and for Different Link
Functions of the Ordered Response Model – Five-fold Cross-Validation (37
covariates)
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Table 1.1: Proportion of Submissions to REF Economics and Econometrics
Panel Meeting REF Quality Standards 1, 2, 3, 4 by 28 Institutions
Source.—REF 2014 Economics and Econometrics Assessment Unit Results.
* The unclassified category is merged into the first category.
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Chapter 2
Estimating Average Treatment Effects in Eval-
uation Studies: Using the Dirichlet Process
Matching 1
2.1 Introduction
Program evaluation studies typically conduct comparisons between treated and controlled
units in order to learn about the treatment effect on individuals who have participated
in a certain program. A prominent example is given by LaLonde (1986), which estimates
the earnings effects of a US job training program by comparing the program participants
(treatment group) and the non-participants (control group). If both groups were randomly
selected into the study, simply comparing their average wages would have yielded an unbi-
ased average treatment effect (ATE). However, with observational (or non-experimental)
data, participants and non-participants may differ significantly along a number of impor-
tant dimensions (i.e. participants are not randomly assigned to the treatment), and thus
1 I would like to thank Sascha O. Becker, Mingli Chen, Clément de Chaisemartin, and Michael Pitt for
helpful suggestions and conversations throughout this project. I would like to thank Wiji Arulampalam,
Gianna Boero, François Caron, Bo E. Honoré, Koen Jochmans, Arthur Lewbel, Konrad Menzel, Jeremy
Smith, Roland Rathlot, Mark Steel, and Massimiliano Tani for helpful conversations as well as seminar
participants at the CAGE seminar, Warwick Annual Econometric Workshop, and Southampton PhD
seminar for helpful feedback. This work is financially supported by PhD scholarship from the Department
of Economics at the University of Warwick. All remaining errors are my own.
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the controlled units are not capable of acting as an ideal counterpart to reflect the whole
picture of the treated units. This constitutes a central problem in the program evaluation
literature—the untreated outcome of the treatment group cannot be observed in reality.
Matching, aimed at equalizing or balancing the distribution of covariates across treat-
ment and control groups (Stuart, 2010), has widely been adopted to address the “miss-
ing data” problem. Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) demonstrate that when background
characteristics of the treated and controlled groups are very distinct, matching is a more
effective method to reduce the bias in the estimation of the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT), compared to conventional regression adjustments or selection models.
Moreover, matching is a flexible approach that can be used in combination with other
strategies (e.g. regression adjusted methods). The focus of this paper is on matching
methodology. Unlike existing studies, I suggest an alternative matching estimator, which
naturally meets the balancing property by construction, and hence attains a few desirable
properties addressed in the literature. Moreover, the proposed matching estimator yields
an ATT estimator that has an honest confidence band by taking account the errors from
the matching.
Two most popular matching methodologies among researchers are arguably Maha-
lanobis matching and propensity score matching. These matching methods have been
proved by Rubin and Thomas (1992a,b, 1996) and Rubin and Stuart (2006) to be equal-
percent-bias-reducing (EPBR) after imposing necessary conditions on matching covari-
ates.2 In the absence of the EPBR condition, the propensity score matching can still be
useful as it possesses sound theoretical properties. Indeed, the propensity score, which em-
bodies the joint distribution of the underlying covariates, can serve as a “balancing score”,
if the score has been correctly specified. The propensity score is described as “balancing” if
underlying covariates are balanced between the treatment group and the controlled group.3
2The EPBR condition requires that the matching covariates are (mixtures of) symmetric elliptical
distributed. However, this is a very demanding assumption and might be violated when, for instance,
researchers try to incorporate discrete or categorical variables.
3As noted by Abadie and Imbens (2016), “misspecification of the propensity score typically leads to
inconsistency of the treatment effect estimator, unless the misspecified propensity score constitutes a
balancing score.”
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Unfortunately, in the real word, it is almost impossible for us to know the true specification
underlying the propensity score. A practical solution suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1984) is to manually and iteratively attempt different specifications until the score is well
balanced. Implementing such procedures can, however, be time-consuming and compli-
cated. As a consequence, people might feel reluctant to do so. For instance, Diamond and
Sekhon (2012) review articles published in famous economics journals during the 2000s
and find that only about 32 percent of the empirical applications of matching have actu-
ally considered covariate balance. It should be noted that although there exist a number
of other solutions to overcome lack of knowledge of the true propensity score,4 they are
unanimously based on large sample properties.
The present paper develops a balancing matching approach, namely the Dirichlet pro-
cess (DP) matching, which by its nature satisfies the balancing property. To put it simple,
the DP matching first approximates a joint distribution of detailed confounding variables
in the treatment group and then matches each controlled unit to the treated if their con-
founding variables are in the same covariate space. The DP matching process should
therefore properly impose the stochastic balancing property between the treatment and
control groups.
More specifically, the joint distribution of the covariates is approximated by the Dirich-
let process mixture (DPM) of normal distributions. If the mixture components are suffi-
ciently large, a mixture of normal distributions can well approximate any arbitrary multi-
variate distribution. See Ferguson (1983), Rasmussen and Ghahramani (2002) and Rossi
(2013) for finite/infinite mixture with continuous variables, and Norets and Pelenis (2012)
for finite mixture with both continuous and discrete marginals. For example, macroe-
conomists commonly use a mixture of seven normals to approach the log chi-squared error
term in a stochastic volatility model (Kim et al., 1998; Stock and Watson, 2007). It is found
that under circumstances in which distributions have a waving shape, a mixture of normals
with tiny component variances can precisely approximate the shape of the distributions
4For instance, one can adopt the safeguard options such as the bias-corrected estimator by Abadie and
Imbens (2012), or utilize the nonparametric sieve method to approximate the true propensity score.
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(Rossi, 2013). In addition, one might worry about the choice of the number of components
in a finite mixture model. In such a case, the DPM of normals represents a more flexible
alternative that explicitly allows for a countably infinite number of mixture components.
This can be interpreted as a limit of the finite mixture of normals (Neal, 2000). Moreover,
as is often the case, we need to match on characteristics that are usually measured on
discrete scales, such as ethnicity, marital status, and gender. The discrete confounding
variables in my matching model are augmented using Gaussian latent variables, following
a standard Bayesian procedure proposed by Albert and Chib (1993) and later adopted in
a setting of the mixture of normals model by Norets and Pelenis (2012).
The algorithm put forward by this paper functions as follows. It starts with approximat-
ing the covariate distribution of the treatment group by a DPM of normals. It subsequently
utilizes another DPM of normals (for both the treatment and control groups) that fixes
the covariate space of the treatment group at the posterior derived from the first DPM
model, and distinguishes whether each controlled unit 1) is matched to one of the same
mixtures as the treated; or (2) belongs to the same mixture as other unmatched controlled
units; or (3) forms a new mixture distribution for this controlled unit per se. According to
this matching design, the presence of the untreated sample should not affect the covariate
space of the treated sample. The reason is that the mixture parameters for the matched
controlled units are locked at their posteriors estimated using the first DPM that relies only
on the treated units. Another representation of the DP is the Chinese restaurant process
(CRP). This paper extends this metaphor to the DP matching. Specifically, I describe the
DP matching strategy as a story of the “Chinese restaurant with invited guests”.
The DP matching approach presented in this paper contributes to the existing literature
in three important aspects. First, as explained earlier, this method has the nice feature
that covariate balancing condition is automatically fulfilled. Second, the DP matching, as
a compromise of full covariates matching, is able to produce an efficient ATT estimator.
Hahn (1998) analytically shows that whereas full covariates matching delivers an efficient
ATT estimator, propensity score matching can merely be viewed as a dimensional reduction
device for the ATT estimator. A related concern regarding efficiency of the estimator arises
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in Angrist and Hahn (2004). They use a simple example to empirically illustrate that, when
matched cells are small or information of the treatment group is insufficient, matching on
full covariates will be less efficient than stratification matching via a propensity score. This
is because the stratification on the propensity score takes advantage of information from
the full treatment sample, while the full covariates matching relies only on information
about each cell. Fortunately, this is less of a problem in the DP matching as it exploits
characteristics of the full treatment sample to form matched cells and mixtures. The DP
matching method proposed here effectively combines the advantages of both full covariates
matching and propensity score matching in the sense that it is a full covariates matching
itself but also extracts complete information of the treatment group. As a result, the DP
matching has great potential to induce an efficient ATT estimator.
Third, a further benefit of this new method lies in its ability to produce a credible
confidence band. In fact, the traditional propensity score matching scheme is a two-step
approach, with a propensity score being estimated in the first step and an ATT estimator
being computed accordingly in the second step. Yet, Abadie and Imbens (2002, 2016) point
out that errors in the estimation of the propensity score could lead to incorrect confidence
intervals of the ATT estimator. This has motivated the use of bootstrap. However, existing
research (e.g. Abadie and Imbens, 2008) has not established the credibility of the bootstrap
standard errors of the ATT estimator. In the DP matching, the ATT estimator is integrated
into a single Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. As a result, the posterior
standard deviations of the ATT estimator can be deemed as the “Bayesian equivalent”
standard errors and can thus induce an honest confidence interval of the ATT estimator.
Think of a simple one-dimensional covariate example (Figure 2.1). The controlled unit in
red has a higher probability of being matched (classified into the mixture in blue) and has a
lower probability of being unmatched (classified into the mixture in orange). Each MCMC
iteration will classify this controlled unit into the mixture of the matched (unmatched)
units with a higher (lower) probability. Unlike maximum likelihood estimation that seeks
for an optimal classification, the MCMC samples are able to restore the probability of
being matched or unmatched by sample, after performing sufficiently large iterations. An
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ATT estimator is also calculated at each MCMC iteration step and can therefore directly
reflect the errors in matching.
Based on simulation evidence and empirical results from applying the well-known
LaLonde (1986) dataset, I conclude that the DP matching has several kinds of strength
compared with Nearest Neighbour Matching via Mahalanobis distance or propensity score
matching. Above all, the ATT estimator generated by the DP matching is robust to dif-
ferent specifications with different sets of confounding variables. In addition, a comparison
of results from both the simulation and real data applications show that the DP matching
can deliver a less biased ATT estimator relative to other matching methods. Last but
not least, the DP matching results in a narrower interval estimator, as supported by the
empirical application of the Lalonde data.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2.2, I formulate a treat-
ment effect model framework and develop a Bayesian prospective of the treatment effect
model. Section 2.3 presents details of the proposed DP matching method. In particular,
I briefly review the DPM model and describe how the DPM of normals can approximate
the covariate distribution of treatment group (Section 2.3.1), and then extend the DPM of
normals to the DP matching by taking controlled units into consideration (Section 2.3.2).
The data augmentation for the discrete part of the covariates is discussed in Section 2.3.3.
Section 2.4 summarises the Gibbs sampling scheme for the DP matching. The empirical
application5 of the DP matching is presented in Section 2.5, where I rely on the bench-
mark LaLonde (1986) dataset in observational studies. Section 2.6 concludes this paper
and discusses the potential limitations.
5Evidence from artificial data on comparisons between the DP matching and various propensity match-
ing approaches is provided in Appendix B.1
55
Chapter B §2.2. Observational Studies and Average Treatment Effects
2.2 Observational Studies and Average Treatment Ef-
fects
2.2.1 Notation
Let Ti denote the treatment indicator such that Ti = 1 when the ith unit receives treatment,
and Ti = 0 otherwise. Let X be the multidimensional vector of observable confounding
variables (can be discrete and/or continuous variables). Yi(1) and Yi(0) respectively indi-
cate the potential outcomes for the treated and the controlled units. For each individual
i, we observe Yi = TiYi(1) + (1− Ti)Yi(0).
The observations (i = 1, 2, ..., n) are randomly drawn from a relevant population. I use
subscripts T and C to respectively indicate the treated and the controlled units. I organize
observations so that the first nT observations are associated with the treatment group (i.e.
size of the treated units) and the remaining nC = n−nT pertain to the control group (i.e.
size of the controlled units). Similarly, Xi,T and Xi,C represent the confounding variables
of the treated and untreated samples, respectively.
2.2.2 Framework and Estimands
The quantity of interest in the program evaluation is the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT). The population (PATT τp) and sample average treatment effect on the
treated (SATT τ s) are given by:
τp := E(Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Ti = 1); τ s := 1
nT
n∑
i:Ti=1
(
Yi(1)− Yi(0)
)
where Yi(1) − Yi(0) is the unit-level treatment effect.6 It is obvious that the unbiased
estimator of the PATT (τp) is still the SATT (τ s), and, therefore, a point estimator for
6As argued by Heckman and Robb (1985) and Heckman et al. (1997), the sub-population of the treated
units is often of more interest than the overall population of the treated units in the context of narrowly
targeted programs. In many evaluation studies, the sample is not randomly drawn from a well-defined
population, resulting in difficulties in defining the population average treatment effect. In spite of this,
one could still assume that this sample is randomly drawn from a relevant population, and then express
the expected value of the SATT as an equivalent to the PATT (i.e. E(τs) = τp).
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the PATT should also be an appropriate point estimator for the SATT.
The PATT (τp) can be rewritten as E(Yi(1)|Ti = 1) − E(Yi(0)|Ti = 1). Notice
that conditional expectation E(Yi(0)|Ti = 1) is counterfactual since we could not ob-
serve the untreated outcome of the treated units had they not been treated. In a ran-
domized experimental design, individuals are randomly assigned to the treatment, i.e.,
T⊥(Y (0), Y (1)). So one could simply replace E(Yi(0)|Ti = 1) with the observable out-
come of the controlled units E(Yi(0)|Ti = 0). Conversely, when the treatment is not
randomly assigned in observational studies, one solution is to assume that assignment to
treatment is unconfounded (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and that the probability of re-
ceiving treatment is bounded away from zero to one. In algebra, T⊥(Y (0), Y (1))|X = x
and c < Pr(T = 1|X = x) < 1− c for some c > 0 and for all x in the support of fX|T=1.7
The estimand of the PATT can thus be specified as:
τp = E(τ s) =
∫
E(Y (1)− Y (0)|X = x)fX|T=1(x)dx
=
∫ {
E(Y (1)|X = x, T = 1)
−E(Y (0)|X = x, T = 0)
}
fX|T=1(x)dx
=
∫
τxfX|T=1(x)dx (..)
where the integral operator is over the support of X in a relevant population and τx :={
E(Y (1)|X = x, T = 1)−E(Y (0)|X = x, T = 0)
}
is the ATE for the sub-population with
X = x.
2.2.3 Bayesian Inference with DP Matching
Next I build on the above facts in the literature, and develop an estimator of the ATT
using a Dirichelet process matching method in a Bayesian fashion. I denote the total
7Therefore, instead of assuming random assignment of treatments, we assume that after conditioning on
all observed covariates X, the treatment is as good as randomly assigned. Note that these two assumptions
still hold when conditioning on the propensity score. See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Imbens (2000)
for a rigorous proof.
57
Chapter B §2.2. Observational Studies and Average Treatment Effects
number of matched mixture components by H which is indexed by h = 1, ...,H, and the
resulting allocation of each unit by Si ∈ {1, 2, ...,H}. Conditioning on a suitable prior
H and the data X, the DP matching procedure matches the treated and controlled units
as well as generates a posterior of allocation Si|X,H for each unit. By construction, in
each component h as defined by the DP matching, the covariates are balanced and the
treatment assignment can be seen as random. Therefore, the ATE in a component τh,
corresponding to τx in .., can be calculated whilst considering the treatment as if it had
been randomly assigned:
τh := E(Y (1)|T = 1,S = h,Xh,H)− E(Y (0)|T = 0,S = h,Xh,H) (..)
where Xh is the subsample of component h from the full sample of covariates X, and
the expected values of Y (1) and Y (0) in the last equation are simply the posterior means
of Y (1) and Y (0). Therefore, in the language of Bayesian modelling, the ATE can be
regarded as the difference between the posterior means of the two groups; and the variance
of the ATE is the variance of the difference between the posterior means. Assume that
Y is normally distributed and I impose a conjugate normal-inverse-gamma prior on its
parameters. By the conjugacy of normal likelihood and normal-inverse-gamma prior, the
marginal posterior of τh follows a student-t distribution:8
τh ∼ tvn
(
E(τh|Yh,S = h,Xh,H),Var(τh|Yh,S = h,Xh,H)
)
(..)
where vn denotes the posterior degrees of freedom of the student-t distribution. It can be
shown that, under a diffused prior, the marginal posterior mean of the ATE approaches
the difference between the sample-averages of YT and YC :
E(τh|Yh,S = h,Xh,H)→
∑nT
i:Si=h Yi,T
nT,h
−
∑nC
i,C:Si=h Yi,C
nC,h
(..)
8The textbook by Hoff (2006) provides the details of derivation, for example.
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as the sample size goes to infinity. Here nT,h and nC,h are respectively the number of
treated and controlled units in matched component h. Furthermore, the integral over the
distribution of the covariates fX|T=1(x) in Equation (..) can be discretized into H parts
by the DPM of normals, which implies that the posterior mean of the ATT conditional on
the allocation can be written as:
E(τ |Y,S, X,H) =
H∑
h=1
nT,h
nT
× E(τh|Yh,S = h,Xh,H) (..)
By the same token, the posterior variance of the ATT can be written as:
Var(τ |Y,S, X,H) = 1
nT
[
Var(Y |T = 1, X,H)
+
1
nT
H∑
h=1
n2T,h
nC,h
Var(Y |T = 0,S = h,Xh,H)
]
(..)
Note that the superscript τ has been eliminated. This is because the proposed estimator
is not only used to estimate τp or E(τ s) but is also useful in the estimation of its sample
analogue τ s.
Finally, to feature the posterior distribution from the MCMC output, a Rao-Blackwell
estimator of the ATT via the DP matching can be obtained as:
Ê(τ |Y,X,H) = 1
J
J∑
j=1
E(τ |Y,S(j), X,H) (..)
where S(j) (j = 1, ..., J) are the MCMC samples drawn from a target distribution S|X,H.
It is worth noting that, by the Rao-Blackwellization, the posterior variance of τ has
the following representation:
Var(τ |Y,X,H) = ES|X,H
[
Var(τ |Y,S, X,H)]
+VarS|X,H
[
E(τ |Y,S, X,H)] (..)
Equation (..) reveals that the variance of the ATT consists of two parts: 1) the first term
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reflects the average variance of the ATT in the sample, and 2) the second term captures
the variations trigged by the matching procedure. As highlighted in Section 2.1, errors
in matching should be accounted for in the ATT (Abadie and Imbens, 2002, 2016), and
the Bayesian MCMC method illustrated in this paper provides an automated solution by
explicitly incorporating the matching variations into the variance estimator of the ATT.
2.3 Dirichlet Process Matching
2.3.1 Estimating the Distribution of Covariates of the Treated
This subsection describes how the DPM of normals model approximates the covariate
distribution of the treatment group. This also serves as a brief review of the DP and DPM
(see Teh, 2011; Teh et al., 2012, for a more rigorous review). For now, I let X be a random
vector of continuous covariates. In Section 2.3.3 I extend X to include both continuous
and discrete marginals.
The Dirichlet process was pioneered in Ferguson (1973). It refers to a distribution of
the random probability measure P over a space Θ, such that for any finite measurable
partition A1, ..., Ar of Θ, the vector (P (A1), ..., P (Ar) is distributed as a finite-dimensional
Dirichlet distribution with parameter (MG(A1), ...,MG(Ar)):
(P (A1), ..., P (Ar)) ∼ Dir(MG(A1), ...,MG(Ar)) (..)
Then one could write P ∼ DP(M,G) if P is a random probability measure with distribution
given by the Dirichlet process. The Dirichlet process can be employed as a non-parametric
prior on the parameters of a mixture model (Ferguson, 1983). Consider that we intend
to model the distribution of covariates in the treatment group by the mixture of normals,
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then we could suppose that the data Xi,T is generated through the mechanism below:
Xi,T |θi,T ∼ FN (θi,T )
θi,T |PT ∼ PT
PT ∼ DP(M,G) (..)
Model (..) indicates that the covariates of the treatment group X1,T , ..., Xn,T are ran-
domly drawn from a mixture of multivariate normal distributions FN (θ), where θT =
(µT ,ΣT )
′ includes parameters of the multivariate normal distribution. To formulate a
mixture model, I let the mixing distribution or random probability measure on θT be PT .
The prior over PT is distributed according a Dirichlet process, DP(M,G), with concentra-
tion parameter M and base distribution G. Hence, model (..) is formally referred as
the Dirichlet process mixture (DPM) of normals.
The draws of θT from the DP are discrete and exhibit a clustering property. To see this,
one needs to marginalize out PT in model (..) and write the prior predictive distribution
of θi,T in the following form (Blackwell and MacQueen, 1973):
θi,T |θ1,T , ..., θi−1,T ,M,G ∼ M
M + i− 1G+
∑i−1
l=1 δθl,T
M + i− 1 (..)
where δθT is the distribution concentrated at a single point θT . To understand the clustering
property, one could consider the fact that θ1,T , ..., θi−1,T take only KT distinct values say,
θ∗1,T , ..., θ
∗
KT ,T
. I thus rewrite (..) as:
θi,T |θ1,T , ..., θi−1,T ,M,G ∼ M
M + i− 1G+
∑KT
k=1 nk,T
M + i− 1 δθ∗k,T (..)
where nk,T is the number of θi,T (i = 1, ..., nT ) that are equal to θ∗k,T . Obviously, the
weighted average (i.e. with relevant proportions MM+i−1 in the first term and 1− MM+i−1 in
the second term) in Equation (..) represents a mixture. Another perspective taken on
the DP is the Chinese restaurant process (CRP) (Aldous, 1985; Pitman, 2002). It is helpful
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to be precise about the story behind the CRP. It describes a Chinese restaurant with an
infinite number of tables: a customer θi,T enters the restaurant and will be stochastically
seated according to the number of people who have already settled at each table. S/he can
be seated at table θ∗k,T with a probability proportional to the number of existing customers
nk,T at this table, or be seated at a free table with a probability proportional to M .
The CRP representation not only features the clustering property but also helps to
render an efficient collapsed Gibbs sampling scheme for the DPM of normals with a con-
jugate prior. Model (..) can be rewritten using the representation of the CRP mixture
of normals:
Xi,T |θ∗k,T ∼ FN (θ∗Si,T )
θ∗k,T |θ0 ∼ G(θ0) (k = 1, ...∞)
Si,T |M,S−i,T ∼ CRP(M,S−i,T ) (i = 1, ..., nT ) (..)
whereG(θ0) is chosen to be a natural conjugate prior distribution (Normal-Inverse-Wishart)
with hyper-parameter θ0. S denotes the seating arrangement or the mixture label for each
observation, and is distributed as a Chinese restaurant process:9
p(Si,T = k|M,S−i,T ) =

nk,T
M + i− 1 , k = 1, ...,KT
M
M + i− 1 , k > KT
To sample (θ∗k,T ,Si,T ) from their posterior densities in model (..) when conjugate
priors are used, the collapsed Gibbs sampling method can be adopted (Algorithm 2 in Neal
(2000)). According to the Rao-Blackwell theorem, one could collapse out θ∗k,T and sample
9See for example, Wood and Black (2008) for the derivation.
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only Si,T from its posterior distribution.10 Therefore, in our case Si,T can be sampled by:
p(Si,T = k|S−i,T , XT ,M, θ0)
∝ p(ST |M)p(XT |ST , θ0)
= p(Si,T = k|S−i,T ,M)p(Xi,T |Si,T = k,S−i,T , X−i,T ,M, θ0)
= p(Si,T = k|S−i,T ,M)p(Xi,T |Xk−i,T , θ0)
=
nk−i,T
M + nT − 1
∫
FN (Xi,T |θ∗k,T )p(θ∗k,T |Xk−i,T , θ0)dθ∗k,T (..)
where −i, T indicates all observations except for the current i, k−i means the observations
in the cluster k except for i, and the integral is essentially the posterior predictive density
of Xi,T based on prior G(θ0) and all observations of XT in component k except for the
current i.
Since a conjugate prior of G (i.e., Normal-Inverse Wishart) is employed, the resulting
posterior predictive turns out to follow a multivariate student-t distribution. Moreover,
the update of Si when i starts a new component or table is:
p(Si,T = KT + 1|S−i,T , Xi,T , {θ∗k,T }∞1 ,M, θ0)
∝ p(Si,T = KT + 1|S−i,T , {θ∗k,T }∞1 ,M, θ0)p(Xi,T |S−i,T ,M, θ0,Si,T = KT + 1)
= p(Si,T = KT + 1|S−i,T ,M)p(Xi,T |θ0)
=
M
M + nT − 1
∫
FN (Xi,T |θ∗T )dG(θ∗T |θ0) (..)
where the latter term in the integral is merely the prior density of Xi,T .
2.3.2 Extension to the Dirichlet Process Matching
Next, I bring the control group into the picture and extend the above steps to a matching
procedure. Remember that model (..) generates the posterior of {θi,T , i = 1, ..., nT }
of the treatment sample. Once the controlled units are included, I regard θi,T as known
10In simple words, the Rao-Blackwell theorem states that when sampling from P (A,B|H), a more
efficient way is to marginalize out B and sample only one conditional posterior P (A|H). With a smaller
state space, the sampler typically converges faster to the equilibrium distribution (Liu, 2001).
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and fix it at the posterior, and then predict {θi,C , i = nT + 1, ..., n} of the control sample.
Therefore, the Dirichlet process matching could be formulated according to the following
data generating process:
For i = 1, ..., nT :
Xi,T |θi,T ∼ FN (θi,T )
θi,T |PT ∼ PT
PT ∼ DP(M,G) (..)
For i = 1, ..., nT , nT + 1, ..., n :
Xi|θi ∼ FN (θi)
θ = (θknownT , θC)
′
θi|P ∼ P
P ∼ DP(M,G) (..)
In model (..), {θi,T , i = 1, ..., nT } of the treated units are treated as known and are
fixed at their posteriors that have been obtained with model (..). For the controlled
units, θi,C could either be equal to a certain θi,T that is the same as the treatment group,
or be equal to other values that differ from the treatment group. If a controlled unit’s
covariates parameter θi,C is equal to any value of θi,T , this unit will not contribute to the
posterior θT , as θT is always fixed at the posterior using the treatment sample only. This
is in line with the nature of matching: the successfully paired controlled and treated units
are supposed to have the same joint distribution, while controlled units in their own rights
exert trivial influences on the covariate distribution of treated units.
In model (..), the measurable space Θ can be partitioned into r < ∞ subsets
A1, ..., AKT , AKT+1 , ..., Ar, with the following random probability measures:
P (A1), ..., P (AKT ), P (AKT+1), ..., P (Ar) ∼ Dir
(
MG(A1), ...,MG(AKT ),MG(AKT+1), ...,MG(Ar)
)
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Let nk = #{i : θi ∈ Ak} indicate the total count of observed values in partition Ak. Then
the likelihood model is a multinomial distribution that contains the numbers of observed
values (n1, ..., nKT , nKT+1, ..., nr) for each subset. By the conjugacy of multinomial and
Dirichlet distributions, we can derive the following Dirichlet posterior:
(
P (A1), ..., P (AKT ), P (AKT+1), ..., P (Ar)
)|θ1, ...θnT , θnT+1, ..., θn
∼ Dir
(
MG(A1) + n1, ...,MG(AKT ) + nKT ,MG(AKT+1) + nKT+1, ...,MG(Ar) + nr
)
∼ Dir
(
MG(A1) + n1,C + n1,T , ...,MG(AKT ) + nKT ,C + nKT ,T ,
MG(AKT+1) + nKT+1,C + nKT+1,T , ...,MG(Ar) + nr,T + nr,C
)
where the last line exploits the fact that nk comprises numbers from both the treated and
controlled units in partition k (i.e. nk = nk,T + nk,C). By the definition of the Dirichlet
process described earlier (Ferguson, 1973), this could be written as:
P |θ1, ...θnT , θnT+1, ..., θn ∼ DP
(
M + nC + nT ,
M
M + nC + nT
G+
∑nC+nT
i=1 δθi
M + nC + nT
)
The predictive distribution of θn+1 given observed θ1, ..., θn, can be written as:11
θn+1|θ1, ...θnT , θnT+1, ..., θn ∼
MG+
∑nC+nT
i=1 δθi
M + nC + nT
After grouping the same values of θi into every single θ∗k, the CRP representation takes
the following form:
θn+1|θ1, ...θnT , θnT+1, ..., θn ∼
M
M + nC + nT
G+
∑KT+KC
k=1 nkδθ∗k
M + nC + nT
11 By the definition of the DP, the base distribution G is also the expected value of the process. Therefore,
for any measurable partition A, the posterior mean of the base distribution is:
E(P (A)|θ1, ..., θn) = MG(A) +
∑nC+nT
i=1 δθi(A)
M + nC + nT
Since Pr(θn+1 ∈ A|θ1, ..., θn) = E(P (A)|θ1, ..., θn), the predictive of θn+1 ∈ A|θ1, ..., θn+1 can be viewed as
a posterior of the base distribution.
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Note that among all of the counts (n1, ..., nKT , nKT+1..., nr), the first (n1, ..., nKT ) may si-
multaneously contain treated and controlled individuals, whereby the remaining (nKT+1, ..., nr)
include only the control sample. This leads to the following representation:
θn+1|θ1, ...θnT , θnT+1, ..., θn
∼ M
M + nC + nT
G+
∑KT+KC
k=1 nkδθ∗k
M + nC + nT
∼ M
M + nC + nT
G+
∑KT+KC
k=1 (nk,T + nk,C)δθ∗k
M + nC + nT
∼ M
M + nC + nT
G+
∑KT
k=1(nk,T + nk,C)δθ∗knownk,T
M + nC + nT
+
∑KT+KC
k=KT+1
nk,Cδθ∗k,C
M + nC + nT
(..)
Still, the expression in .. is a mixture. It is important to note that for a particular
controlled unit, there are three options available rather than two: 1) its θi,C is equal to the
posterior of θ∗knownk,T obtained using the treatment sample only with a probability propor-
tional to nk,T +nk,C (matched); 2) its θi,C is equal to θ∗k,C with a probability proportional to
nk,C (unmatched); and 3) θi,C samples a new value from G with a probability proportional
to M (unmatched).
I describe the DP matching as a story of the Chinese restaurant with invited guests:
nT hosts (the treated) came to a Chinese restaurant and sat at KT tables. They have
ordered θ∗knownk,T dishes, and are waiting for their invited guests (the controlled) to arrive
and share the dishes. The controlled unit or the invited guest could be seated on one of
the existing tables occupied by the host (the treated) and enjoy the dishes (posterior of
θ∗knownk,T ). However, in the Chinese folk culture, it is the host who determines what to eat
and the guest(s) rarely order food, suggesting that guests should not contribute to the
values of θ∗k,T ’s posterior. In cases where a controlled unit or a guest is not invited, s/he
could sit at an existing table with other uninvited customers and order new dishes θ∗k,C ;
alternatively, s/he could sit at a new table. In this metaphor, only controlled units who
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are described as the invited guests, are considered as matched.12
Specifically, the CRP version of the DP matching has the following expression:
For i = 1, ..., nT :
Xi,T |θ∗k,T ∼ FN (θ∗Si,T )
θ∗k,T |θ0 ∼ G(θ0) (k = 1, ...∞)
Si,T |M,S−i,T ∼ CRP(M,S−i,T ) (i = 1, ..., nT ) (..)
For i = 1, ..., nT , nT + 1, ..., n :
Xi|θi ∼ FN (θi)
θ∗ = (θ∗knownT , θ
∗
C)
′
θ∗k|θ0 ∼ G(θ0) (k = 1, ...∞)
S = (SknownT ,SC)′
Si|M,S−i ∼ CRP(M,S−i) (i = 1, ..., nT ) (..)
In model (..), {θk,T , k = 1, ...,KT } and {Si,T , i = 1, ..., nT } of the treated sample are
held at their posteriors computed from model (..). Using the same argument of the
collapsed Gibbs sampling as in the previous subsection, {Si,C , i = 1, ..., nC} for the control
group can be updated from:
SiC |S−i, X,M, θ0 ∼

nk,T + nk−i,C
M + nT + nC − 1
∫
FN (Xi,C |θ∗k,T )p(θ∗,knownk,T |Xk,T , θ0)dθ∗,knownk,T
nk−i,C
M + nT + nC − 1
∫
FN (Xi,C |θ∗k,C)p(θ∗k,C |Xk−i,C , θ0)dθ∗k,C
M
M + nT + nC − 1
∫
FN (Xi,C |θ∗C)dG(θ∗C |θ0)
where the integral in the first line corresponds to the predictive density of Xi,C based on
the posterior of θ∗,knownk,T |Xk,T , θ0.
12Figures B.5-B.6 in the appendix to the paper visualize this metaphor
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2.3.3 With Discrete Covariates
To deal with the discrete component of the covariates, I apply the classic Bayesian data
augmentation approach by Albert and Chib (1993), which was originally developed to
augment the dependent variable in a probit model. This approach basically augments
discrete variables by the Gaussian latent variables. I denote the observed pre-treatment
characteristics by X ∈ Rq+p. The normal and the discrete part of X are denoted by
XC ∈ Rq and XD ∈ Rp, respectively. The Gaussian latent variable used to expand the
discrete XDi is X
D∗ . The distribution of X can be specified as a single normal distribution:
FN (XC , XD
∗ |θ) = FN (XC |θ)FN (XD∗ |XC , θ)
where θ = (θC , θD)′ = (µC ,ΣC , µD,ΣD)′. This suggests that when we have mixed-type
data that has both Gaussian and discrete marginals, the discrete part can be treated as
a Gaussian marginal and can be framed into a single multivariate Gaussian distribution.
For instance, Pitt et al. (2006) and Smith and Khaled (2012) successfully augment discrete
marginals and fit them into a single Gaussian copula. Norets and Pelenis (2012) employs
this method to combine discrete and continuous variables into a single finite mixture of
normal distributions.
With regard to posterior sampling, I am able to remain within the efficient collapsed
Gibbs sampler with the aid of the Gaussian latent variable. In practice, one just needs to
include an additional Gibbs step for updating the latent variable XD∗ . First, the condi-
tional density for the latent variable [XD∗ |θ∗, XCi , XD
∗
i ] in one of the mixture components
13
can be derived as follows:
Pr(XDi = x|θ∗, XCi , XD
∗
i ) =

1, XD
∗
i ∈ (c−XDi , c
+
XDi
]
0, otherwise
where c−
XDi
and c+
XDi
are lower and upper bounds of XD∗i when transferring X
D
i = x to
13Note that I omitted the mixture class label (subscription k on each variable) in following expressions
for clarity.
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XD
∗
i . Second, the individual value of the latent variable X
D∗ ∈ Rp can be generated from:
f(XD
∗ |θ,XD, XC) =
n∏
i=1
f(XDi |θ∗, XCi , XD
∗
i )fN (X
D∗
i |θ∗, XCi )
=
n∏
i=1
Pr(XDi = x|θ∗, XCi , XD
∗
i )fN (X
D∗
i |θ∗, XCi ) (..)
where fN (XD
∗
i |θ∗, XCi ) = N (XD
∗
i |µDC ,ΣDC) in which, by the bivariate normal partition
formula,
µDC = µD + ΣDCΣC
−1
(XC − µC)
ΣDC = ΣDD − ΣDCΣC−1ΣCD (..)
It is worthwhile to mention again that the above conditional density should be generated
repeatedly for each mixture component.
On top of this, by the nature of matching, the controlled sample should have no impact
on the treatment group. Hence, XT of the treatment sample is updated in the model
(..) with treated units only. When it comes to the model (..), XT is also locked
at the posterior and the sampling of X would only update the XC of the controlled units.
2.4 Estimation Method
2.4.1 Gibbs Sampler
Next, I combine above results and summarize the Gibbs sampling scheme for the proposed
DP matching algorithm. Here I slightly change the definition of covariates X. Let X
contains the continuous component and the latent Gaussian component X = (XC , XD∗).
In order to assign a “default prior” on the covariates with different scales, I normalize each
continuous marginal of X by subtracting its sample mean of treatment group and dividing
by the treatment standard deviation. In each iteration j = 1, ..., J of the Gibbs sampling,
I sequentially update following conditional posteriors.
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Step 1. Sampling the class labels of the treatment group Si,T
First, I focus on the treatment sample only (model ..). For the treatment sample
i = 1, ..., nT :
Si,T |S−i,T , X,M, θ0 ∼

nk−i,T
M + nT − 1
∫
FN (Xi,T |θ∗k,CT )p(θ∗k,T |Xk−i,T , θ0)dθ∗k,T
M
M + nT − 1
∫
FN (Xi,T |θ∗T )dG(θ∗T |θ0)
If as a result of sampling Si,T some mixture component k of the treated sample becomes
empty (i.e. nk,T = 0) in jth iteration, then the previously matched controlled units to
this k will be regarded as unmatched. And these controlled units themselves will form an
additional mixture of unmatched units only.
Step 2. Sampling the mixture parameter of the treatment group
Using the collapsed Gibbs sampling, there is no need to update θ∗k. However, to proceed to
sampling from other conditionals, I still update θ∗k. Then for each component k = 1, ...,KT :
θ∗k,T |XT , θ0 ∼
∏
i:i∈k,Ti=1
FN (Xi,T |θ∗k,T )G(θ∗k,T |θ0)
Step 3. Sampling the Gaussian latent variable of the treatment group
In the treatment sample, for each discrete marginal X(l) out of all X = (X(l), X(−l)) and
for each component k = 1, ...,KT , compute Σ
(l)(−l)
k,T and µ
(l)(−l)
k,T using formulas (..),
and sample X(l)T from following truncated normal:
X
(l)
T |θ∗k,T , X(l)Dk,T , X(−l)k,T ∼
∏
i:i∈k,Ti=1
Pr(X
(l)D
i,T = x|θ∗k,T , X(−l)i,T , X(−l)i,T )N (X(l)i,T |µ(l)(−l)k,T ,Σ(l)(−l)k,T )
Step 4. Sampling the class labels of the control group Si,C
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Then I consider the model for matching (model ..), in which both treated units and
controlled units are included. Note that {Si,T , i = 1, ..., nT } are fixed at their postreriors
from model (..). So I just need to update the class labels of the control group. For
the control sample i = nT + 1, ..., n:
Si,C |S−i, X,M, θ0 ∼

nk,T + nk−i,C
M + nT + nC − 1
∫
FN (Xi,C |θ∗k,T )p(θ∗k,T |Xk,T , θ0)dθ∗k,T
nk−i,C
M + nT + nC − 1
∫
FN (Xi,C |θ∗k,C)p(θ∗k,C |Xk−i,C , θ0)dθ∗k,C
M
M + nT + nC − 1
∫
FN (Xi,C |θ∗C)dG(θ∗C |θ0)
Step 5. Sampling the mixture parameter θ∗k when including the control group
For each component k = 1, ...,KT , θ∗k is set to be equal to θ
∗
k,T (obtained in Step 2).
And for each component k = KT + 1, ...,K which contains only the control group, the
parameters θ∗k,C has following conditional posterior:
θ∗k,C |XC , θ0 ∼
∏
i∈k
FN (Xi,C |θ∗k,C , θ0)G(θ∗k,T |θ0)
Step 6. Sampling the Gaussian latent variable when including the control
group
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, {Xi,t, i = 1, ..., nT } of the treatment group are fixed at
the values sampled in Step 3. Hence I only update X(l)i,C given the full sample. For
each discrete marginal X(l) out of all X = (X(l), X(−l)) and for each component k =
1, ...,KT ,KT + 1, ...,K, compute Σ
(l)(−l)
k and µ
(l)(−l)
k using formulas (..), and sample
X
(l)
C from following truncated normal:
X
(l)
C |θ∗k, X(l)Dk , X(−l)k ∼
∏
i∈k
Pr(X
(l)D
i,C = x|θ∗k, X(−l)i,C , X(−l)i,C )N (X(l)i,C |µ(l)(−l)k ,Σ(l)(−l)k )
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2.4.2 Prior Specifications
Simply fixing the prior parameters at certain values might be dogmatic. To allow the model
to be more flexible, I adopt hierarchical priors on the model parameters. Firstly, to assign
a prior for the data with different scales, all marginals of X need to be standardized. I
normalize continuous marginals of X into the N (0, 1) scale by subtracting its sample mean
and dividing by the sample standard deviation. Secondly, the base distribution G(θ0) of the
DP appears in its role as the prior distribution of normal mixture parameters θ∗k = (µk,Σk).
I choose a normal-inverse-Wishart prior, i.e.:
µk|Σk ∼ N (µ0, κ−10 Σk)
Σk ∼ IWν0(Λ0)
where ν0 and Λ0 are the degrees of freedom and the scale matrix of the inverse-Wishart
distribution. Further, I assign the hyper prior on the variable θ0 = (µ0,Σ0, ν0, κ0,Λ0) and
include Step 7 into the Gibbs cycle.
Step 7. Sampling prior on mixture parameters
This paper provides following suggestions on sampling the prior parameters (µ0,Σ0, ν0, κ0,Λ0):
1. µ0 is set to be 0, which simply reflects the sample mean of the normalized variable.
2. Λ0 is the scale matrix of the prior on the variance. Its diagonal elements are in-
dependently generated from: diag(Λ0) ∼ Uniform[0.2, 2]. This is a relative tight
prior, which can ensure that the shape of X can be approximated by enough mixture
components.
3. ν0, which can be thought of as a confidence of the prior, is sampled from: ν0 ∼
Uniform[5, 15] + P + 1, where P is the number of confounding variables.
4. κ−10 , which serves as a multiplier on the variance, is set to be: κ
−1
0 = 10 × ν0. This
allows for a suitably wide range of possible locations of µk.
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Finally, recall that M is a concentration parameter of the Dirichlet process. The con-
centration parameter M controls the number of clusters in a direct manner, with larger
M implying a larger number of clusters a priori (Teh, 2011). To let the M be flexible, I
adopt the approach by Jara et al. (2007) to assign a Gamma prior on the M . Therefore,
Step 8 can be described as follows:
Step 8. Sampling the concentration parameter M
The concentration parameter M is sampled from: M |a0, b0 ∼ Gamma(a0, b0) where a0 =
1, b0 = 1.
Nevertheless, based on my attempts and the results in Jara et al. (2007), the choice
of (a0, b0) will not affect the resulting number of components significantly. In addition,
Rossi (2013) also shows that the density estimates by DPM of normals are not strongly
influenced by the value of the M parameter.
2.4.3 ATT Estimator
After obtaining MCMC sample {S(j), j = 1, ..., J} from its target distribution by above
Gibbs steps 1-8, I compute the ATT estimator. Based on posterior mean of the ATE
(recall τh in Equation ..) in a subpopulation of matched set, the posterior mean of the
ATT (E(τ |Y,S, X,H)) and the the posterior variance of the ATT (Var(τ |Y,S, X,H)) have
closed forms as given in Equation .. and .., respectively. Thus, the Rao-Blackwell
estimator of ATT τ is given by:
Ê(τ |Y,X,H) = 1
J
J∑
j=1
E(τ |Y,S(j), X,H) (..)
V̂ar(τ |Y,X,H) = 1
J
J∑
j=1
[
Var(τ |Y,S(j), X,H)]
+
1
J
J∑
j=1
[
E(τ |Y,S(j), X,H)− Ê(τ |Y,X,H)]2 (..)
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2.5 Data Applications
To validate the proposed DP matching method, I employ both the artificial data and the
real data. Appendix B.1 to this paper provides two applications to the artificial data
and compare the DP matching to various propensity score matching methods. In these
two exercises, the EPBR conditions are satisfied because covariates are not ellipsoidally
distributed. The first exercise shows that the DP matching can explicitly distinguish the
mixture structure of the data. The estimates of the ATT via DP matching or propensity
score matching are all close to the actual effect (Figures B.1-B.2 and Table B.1 ). The
second application uses a synthetic data that the overlap of covariates in treated units and
controlled units is relatively tiny. In the presence of strong separation between the treated
and the controlled, the common support area of the propensity score becomes fairly small.
Then as expected, the point estimates of the ATT via various propensity score matching
methods are more biased, while the DP matching estimator can still successfully prune
the ‘noisy’ controlled units and finally restore the benchmark value (Figures B.3-B.4 and
Table B.2).
2.5.1 The Lalonde (1986) Data
Background
In real data application, this paper applies the well-known LaLonde (1986) data. With
regard to observational studies, the LaLonde (1986) data has been commonly employed as
a canonical benchmark for various causal inference approaches.14 The data originated from
a randomized experiment about a job training program in the US—the National Supported
Work Demonstration (NSW).
Researchers (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, 2002; Smith and Todd, 2005) re-analyze this
data and replace the experimental control group by several other data sources. I restrict
the application to the so-called NSW-PSID-1 subsample and NSW-CPS-3 subsample. The
NSW-PSID-1 consists of 185 treated units from the original experimental data and 2490
14A detailed review of this dataset is provided by Li (2013), for example.
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controlled units from the PSID data. The latter one includes a control group of 429 observa-
tions. In the data, the outcome of interest related to earnings in 1978. Pre-program in-
dividual characteristics include earnings in 1974, earnings in 1975, age, years of
education, Black (dummy), Hispanic (dummy), married (dummy), diploma (dummy),
unemployed in 1974 (dummy), and unemployed in 1975 (dummy). The counterpart of
randomized program data provides a benchmark estimates of the ATE: the difference in
sample means between the treatment group and the control group yields a treatment effect
on post-program earnings of $1794 with a 95 percent confidence interval of [551, 3038].
DP Matching: a graphic analysis
First of all, to illustrate the mechanism behind the DP matching, I match on two variables
using the NSW-PSID-1 subsample, i.e., earnings in 1974 and earnings in 1975, and
cross-plot their distributions using a typical MCMC iteration (Figures 2.2-2.3). Figure 2.2
plots all matched treated and controlled units. The treated units (marked as solid dots in
the plot) have been well-approximated by 9 mixture components, which are highlighted in
9 different colors in the graph. The matched controlled individuals are marked as crosses in
the plot. By the DP matching algorithm, they have been matched to one of the treatment
group’s component (referred to using the same colors in the graph). We can see from the
graph that the matched controls appear to in similar covariates space as the treated. I then
re-plot this graph by introducing the unmatched controlled units (Figure 2.3). The circles
in navy color indicate unmatched controlled individuals. We can see that the majority
of the unmatched controlled individuals have much higher earnings in 1974 and/or 1975,
compared to those of the treated units and the matched controlled units. As suggested
by Figure 2.3, the proposed DP matching method has successfully distinguished and then
pruned these controlled individuals.
It is also very interesting to observe a heterogeneous pattern in earnings from Figure 2.2.
The matched units in red can be viewed as people who were unemployed or who received
very low annual income (less than about $1000) in both years. Individuals plotted in
green belong to the lower income group, whilst those in pink represent the middle class.
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The matched pairs in yellow, orange and grey respectively indicate unemployed people or
people with low income in either 1974 or 1975, but receiving higher income in the other
year. The blue and grey colors indicate people from the higher income group.
Results: ATT estimators
Next, I estimate the ATT using the DP matching, and compare results with those gen-
erated by two nearest-neighbor matching methods (i.e.via the Mahalanobis distance and
via the propensity score). Tables 2.1-2.2 summarize ATT estimates using various sets of
confounding covariates in the NSW-PSID-1 subsample and the NSW-CPS-3 subsample,
respectively.
Looking firstly at the NSW-PSID-1 subsample (Table 2.1), we find that, when matching
on two, five or eight covariates (Panels A-C), the point estimates of the ATT by the DP
matching are closer to the benchmark effect of $1794 than the ones by the nearest-neighbor
matching via the Mahalanobis distance metrics. Despite the fact that the ATT estimates
based on the Mahalanobis distance are less biased in the case of the ten matching variables
(Panel D), the Mahalanobis distance metrics are pretty sensitive to different specifications
with confounding variables. The signs of ATT estimates based on the Mahalanobis distance
are positive in Panels A and D, but become negative in Panels B and C. The ATT estimates
by the DP matching have the best performance in terms of biasedness when compared to
other nearest-neighbor matching methods, when matching on two or five covariates. The
propensity score matching estimates are less biased when eight confounding variables are
included. However, they tend to deviate more from the benchmark effect than the ATT
estimates by the DP matching once ten matching variables are used (Panel D of Table
2.1).
Table 2.2 tells a very similar story in the NSW-CPS-3 subsample. The DP matching
method is still less sensitive to specifications with different matching covariates. When
matching on two or ten covariates, the estimated ATTs by the DP matching are less biased
than those generated by the Mahalanobis distance or the propensity score. It is interesting
to note that when ten confounding covariates are used in the NSW-CPS-3 subsample,
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the nearest-neighbor matching methods will induce (Panel D of Table 2.2) negative ATT
estimates, whereby the DP matching is still able to deliver an ATT estimate that is positive
and closer to the benchmark effect. Furthermore, in both subsamples, the standard errors
of all ATT estimates based on the nearest-neighbor matchings are consistently larger than
the posterior standard deviations of ATT estimates using the DP matching.
Taken as a whole, it is safe to conclude that the DP matching method is robust to
different specifications with different sets of confounding variables. Additionally, it can
generate a well-performed ATT estimator in terms of biasedness and posterior standard
deviation.
2.6 Conclusion
The proposed DP matching method in this paper is committed to delivering a desirable
ATT estimator. It directly matches the controlled units to the treated group on their co-
variates space. Hence the balancing property can be met naturally. The joint distribution
of covariates are approximated by Dirichlet process mixture of normals and the discrete
confounders are augmented by Gaussian latent variables. The MCMC sampler integrates
the matching procedure and the estimation of ATT into a single scheme. It takes matching
uncertainties into account, and therefore, yields a credible confidence interval. When sam-
pling from the posterior densities, hierarchical priors allow further flexibility of the model
and the conjugate prior specification greatly simplifies the computation. The empirical
application suggests that the ATT estimator via DP matching is competitive.
Additionally, it is always important to learn the potential limitations of an proposed
approach. First, unlike the conventional frequentist approaches, the choice of prior spec-
ifications in the proposed approach might result in moderately different posterior ATT.
Second, each covariate should contribute unequally to the matching procedure. For in-
stance, the pre-treatment wage variables in the LaLonde (1986) data seem to have higher
prediction power of the treatment assignments, and as a consequence should have greater
contributions to the matching. The default prior specification suggested in Section 2.4.2
77
Chapter B §2.6. Conclusion
did not particularly address this issue. However, these limitations can be possibly avoided
by choosing appropriate prior distributions. The exploration of the prior settings is left for
the future work.
78
Chapter B §2.6. Conclusion
Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the Probabilities of Matching using a Single Di-
mensional Example
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Figure 2.2: Cross-plot of Matched Units of Pre-program Earning Variables:
400th MCMC Iteration (NSW-PSID-1)
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Figure 2.3: Cross-plot of Unmatched Units of Pre-program Earning Vari-
ables: 400th MCMC Iteration (NSW-PSID-1)
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Table 2.1: Various Estimates for the Lalonde data (NSW-PSID-1)
Est. ATT SD/SE
Panel A: matching on two covariates
DP matching 1810.928 (745.031)
Nearest-neighbor matching (Mahalanobis) 1754.493 (805.123)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-probit) 1436.375 (995.363)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-logit) 1706.182 (992.125)
Panel B: matching on five covariates
DP matching 1620.702 (885.757)
Nearest-neighbor matching (Mahalanobis) −273.007 (1214.134)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-probit) 890.535 (1144.828)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-logit) 1511.544 (1074.692)
Panel C: matching on eight covariates
DP matching 2258.507 (954.075)
Nearest-neighbor matching (Mahalanobis) −739.543 (1093.066)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-probit) 1545.521 (1129.796)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-logit) 2125.715 (1004.261)
Panel D: matching on ten covariates
DP matching 2442.980 (815.443)
Nearest-neighbor matching (Mahalanobis) 2050.486 (924.825)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-probit) 2660.667 (1252.966)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-logit) 925.816 (1684.988)
Notes: First row in each panel presents MCMC posterior mean and standard deviation based on DP
matching. Bootstrap with 100 replications is used to estimate standard errors for propensity score
matching. The benchmark experimental point estimate=1794 with 95% CI∈ [551, 3038].
Panel A is based on the matching on earnings in 1974 and earnings in 1975.
Panel B is based on the matching on earnings in 1974, earnings in 1975, age, years of education
and blackD.
Panel C is based on the matching on earnings in 1974, earnings in 1975, age, years of education,
blackD, hispanicD, marriedD and diplomaD.
Panel D is based on the matching on earnings in 1974, earnings in 1975, age, years of education,
blackD, hispanicD, marriedD, diplomaD, unemployed in 1974D, and unemployed in 1975D.
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Table 2.2: Various Estimates for the Lalonde data (NSW-CPS-3)
Est. ATT SD/SE
Panel A: matching on two covariates
DP matching 869.264 (726.635)
Nearest-neighbor matching (Mahalanobis) 738.679 (832.7141)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-probit) 467.760 (924.903)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-logit) 257.680 (738.636)
Panel B: matching on five covariates
DP matching 1161.169 (879.794)
Nearest-neighbor matching (Mahalanobis) 1028.723 (1221.974)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-probit) 1918.446 (1492.876)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-logit) 867.269 (1037.917)
Panel C: matching on eight covariates
DP matching 1364.988 (860.398)
Nearest-neighbor matching (Mahalanobis) 262.240 (1207.09)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-probit) 1968.800 (1179.098)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-logit) 2125.715 (1004.261)
Panel D: matching on ten covariates
DP matching 1353.728 (858.495)
Nearest-neighbor matching (Mahalanobis) −415.500 (1203.15)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-probit) −1252.038 (1284.344)
Nearest-neighbor matching (propensity score-logit) −1042.433 (1380.570)
Notes: First row in each panel presents MCMC posterior mean and standard deviation based on DP
matching. Bootstrap with 100 replications is used to estimate standard errors for propensity score
matching. The benchmark experimental point estimate=1794 with 95% CI∈ [551, 3038].
Panel A is based on the matching on earnings in 1974 and earnings in 1975.
Panel B is based on the matching on earnings in 1974, earnings in 1975, age, years of education
and blackD.
Panel C is based on the matching on earnings in 1974, earnings in 1975, age, years of education,
blackD, hispanicD, marriedD and diplomaD.
Panel D is based on the matching on earnings in 1974, earnings in 1975, age, years of education,
blackD, hispanicD, marriedD, diplomaD, unemployed in 1974D, and unemployed in 1975D.
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Chapter 3
Empowering Mothers and Enhancing Early
Childhood Investment: Evidence from a Unique
Preschool Program in Ecuador 1
3.1 Introduction
Empowering women and enhancing early childhood development are important policy goals
which are often pursued as separate, discrete initiatives in developing countries. We study
an approach that exploits potential complementarity by pursuing both goals through one
measure, based on empowering mothers and teaching parenting skills that advance their
children’s development. Empowerment for mothers in this program is based on acquiring
knowledge, home and personal practices that strengthen their role in the family and com-
munity and increase awareness of their role in their children’s education. These sessions
1 We thank the AVSI staff in Quito, particularly Sarah Holtz, Amparito Espinoza, Stefania Famlonga,
Lucy Troya, Delia Llanos and Veronica Echeverría and the AVSI staff in Milan, particularly Maria Teresa
Gatti, Andrea Bianchessi and Alberto Piatti for their collaboration and logistical support through the
design, field work and data-collection phases of this study. We thank Sascha O. Becker, Gabriella Conti,
Clément de Chaisemartin, Rocco Macchiavello, Fabian Waldinger, Christopher Woodruff, and participants
at CAGE seminar in the Department of Economics at the University of Warwick and at the RIDGE/NIP-
LACEA Workshop on Inequality, Poverty and Politics for useful comments and suggestions. We thank
CAGE and the Department of Economics at the University of Warwick for financial support for this project.
Victor Lavy acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council through ERC Advance
Grant 323439.
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include joint activities for mothers and their children, and separate group activities for the
children in the program.
The accumulation of evidence that education programs are both more effective and
less costly when delivered to younger children has sharpened the focus on early childhood
research and policy (Heckman et al., 2010, 2013; Gertler et al., 2014). However, questions
remain about which policy tools are most effective.
Similarly, empowering women has been the focus of research and policy because engag-
ing women as equal participants in the community and economy has been seen to enhance
development outcomes (Klugman et al., 2014; Wong, 2012). Doing both - empowering
women in a way that also supports early childhood development - has not been widely
studied, however, it could be a means of achieving both goals. This approach has the po-
tential to deliver improvements in women’s empowerment and status at home and in the
community, as well as improving children’s education. Duflo (2012) defines women’s em-
powerment as “improving the ability of women to access the constituents of development –
in particular health, education, earning opportunities, rights, and political participation”.
Improving mothers’ access to each of these domains can have a positive effect on early
childhood, which has been shown to deliver life-long benefits (Barber and Gertler, 2009;
Carneiro et al., 2013; Kiernan and Huerta, 2008)2. Evidence of spillover effects from early
child development programs on the empowerment of their mothers is scarce and needed
(Baker-Henningham and López Bóo, 2010).
In this paper we study the consequences of a home-preschool program designed to
enhance both women’s empowerment and children’s early childhood development. The
PelCa (preescolar en la casa – home pre-schooling) program started in Pisullì, one of
the poorest neighborhoods of Quito, Ecuador, in 2005. It is run by the Association of
Volunteers in International Service (AVSI), an international non-governmental organization
2Carneiro et al. (2013) find that maternal education leads to more positive home environments, partic-
ularly for low-ability mothers. Moreover, mothers with more schooling invest more quality time with their
children (breastfeeding, reading to them, taking them out) and this is later reflected in better cognitive
outcomes and fewer behavioral problems. According to Barber and Gertler (2009), empowering women
to become informed and active health consumers reduces child mortality, morbidity, anemia, and stunt-
ing. Kiernan and Huerta (2008) show that economic deprivation and maternal depression negatively affect
children’s cognitive and emotional outcomes, partly because of less nurturing and parental engagement.
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founded in Italy that focuses on human development. The program is open to mothers
with children aged up to three years old, and currently involves hundreds of mothers and
children.
In the program we studied, a qualified family advisor trained groups of six to eight
mothers. Children accompanied their mothers in these group sessions, which were held ev-
ery two weeks in the NGO offices. There were three parts to each group session. In the first
part, mothers received structured training focused on strengthening their role in the fam-
ily, and learned parenting techniques that emphasized their children’s early development.
At the same time, children socialized using educational games and didactic materials. In
the second part, family advisors taught mothers and children educational activities that
could be reproduced at home, to improve the quality of maternal-child interactions and
enhance mothers’ participation in child development activities. In the third part, advisors
monitored and assessed the home assignments from the previous meeting.
The program was implemented non-experimentally, but since its initiation in 2005, new
families have joined every year. Assuming that new applicants resemble those who joined
the program earlier, we selected a control group from the applicants in 2012. Following our
suggestion, the NGO made a special effort to reach as many eligible families as possible
in 2012. This provided us with a large pool of applicants from which we selected our
control group, which consisted of families that had an older child in any grade in primary
school and a younger child who would enroll in the program jointly with his or her mother.
This can be viewed as a quasi-natural experiment, and we will demonstrate that it yields
well-balanced treatment and control groups.
We evaluate the effect on women’s empowerment after two to seven years of participa-
tion in the program by focusing on: self-esteem, inputs into child education, labor-market
participation and earnings, allocation of decision-making within the household, and eco-
nomic and social independence. We also examine the impact on children’s educational
outcomes, such as how likely children were to repeat a grade or drop out of school, and
how they fared in cognitive tests. Our evidence shows that the program empowered women
in various dimensions: mothers who participated in the program for two to seven years
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are more likely to be employed, more likely to have a full-time job, and more likely to
have a formal-sector job. Mothers who have been in the program also earn higher wages,
and are more likely to manage their own money and to make independent decisions about
how to spend it. Women’s autonomy is also reflected in a higher likelihood of deciding
by themselves whether to work outside the home, and a higher likelihood of returning to
school as an adult. Moreover, there is evidence that these women take on a greater role
overall in intra-household decisions, especially on matters involving children’s education
and discipline. Mothers who participated in the program increased their child investment,
for example by spending more time practicing cognitive and social skills with their children.
The program had mixed effects on children: it significantly reduced the drop-out rate
and likelihood of temporarily withdrawing from school, and it improved scores in cognitive
tests (though it is precisely measured only for some sub-groups of the overall sample).
However, we find no effect on children’s self-reported or mother-reported attitudes towards
schooling.
Allowing for heterogeneity of treatment effect by mother’s pre-program characteristics
and outcomes and by child gender reveals meaningful differences, which we use to interpret
our findings. All of the above results hold when we estimate aggregate treatment impacts,
using summary indices instead of individual outcomes, in order to account for multiple in-
ference, when we use entropy balancing to adjust for differences in pre-treatment covariates,
and when we use other robustness checks.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we present an
overview of the literature on women’s empowerment and on early childhood development.
Section 3.3 outlines the background and design of the quasi-natural experiment. In Section
3.4 we describe the data and in Section 3.5 we discuss the empirical analysis and results.
In Section 3.6 we explore potential mechanisms through which results are achieved and
discuss robustness checks. The conclusion is in Section 3.7.
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3.2 Related Literature on Early Childhood Interven-
tions
The present work is related to two different literatures: studies on women’s empowerment
and studies on early childhood development. The literature on women’s empowerment is
more extensive. Kabeer (2005) defines empowerment as the “ability to make choices” in
ways that change power relations and affect women’s education, employment, and politi-
cal participation. Duflo (2012) defines women’s empowerment as improving women access
and utilization of social, political and economic opportunities. Decision-making within the
household is also an important indicator of the distribution of power within the household
(Alkire, 2007; Narayan-Parker, 2005). We will follow this approach and explore intra-
household decisions, capturing women’s power relations within the household and their
access to the constituents of development (e.g. whether they are allowed to work). Differ-
ent channels for empowering women have been explored. Education is sometimes proposed
as one of the main drivers of empowerment (Oyitso and Olomukoro, 2012) , but the evi-
dence is mixed. There is substantial evidence that education can improve cognitive skills,
raise aspirations, allow access to information, raise awareness to real conditions, and help
coping with dis-equilibrium (Kabeer, 2005; LeVine et al., 2001). More educated women
also experience less domestic violence (Kabeer, 2005; Sen, 1999). Mocan and Cannonier
(2012) find that more educated women in Sierra Leone are “more intolerant of practices
that conflict with their well-being”. It is less clear, however, whether this change in prefer-
ences translates into behavior. Andrabi et al. (2012) show that higher maternal education
improves maternal child care, but the study does not find an effect on intra-household
decision-making.
Women are also empowered by accumulating wealth but there is little evidence on
how to enhance the mechanism. Microfinance programs can facilitate the accumulation of
economic assets but evidence for a causal effect of such programs on women’s empowerment
is mixed. Kabeer (2001, 2005) suggests that women’s access to credit improves women’s
self-perception, reduces domestic violence and increases women’s power in the household
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decision-making process. In households where the loan recipient was male, the role of
women in decision-making regarding loan use, enterprise management and allocation of
profits was much lower than in households where the loan recipient was a female. However,
Banerji et al. (2013) find no short- or long-run effects of micro-credit in India on women’s
empowerment.
Baker-Henningham and López Bóo (2010) suggest that training mothers in group par-
enting sessions is a cost-effective method of service delivery but little is known about the
effect of such programs on mothers’ longer term well-being and life course outcomes. Our
study is the first to focus on long-term exposure to group parenting sessions and its im-
pact on both mothers and their children and it contributes to the growing literature on
early age interventions. Among others, we note the Abecedarian project, High Scope Perry
Preschool Program, Chicago Child-Parent Centers and the Head Start Program. Evidence
suggests that these programs led to improved schooling attainment and better outcomes
in adulthood (higher employment rate and earnings, lower crime rates). For example,
the pre-school Abecedarian project improved children’s reading and mathematics achieve-
ments, lowered grade retention and increased completed education at adulthood (Campbell
et al., 2002; Temple and Reynolds, 2007). The High Scope Perry preschool program af-
fected the schooling outcomes of girls only: by age 19 treated females had a higher school
GPA and completed a higher grade (Heckman et al., 2013); by age 27 treated females were
30% less likely to drop-out from high-school (Nores et al., 2005). We note however, that
these interventions target the most-disadvantaged groups and that such programs may be
unfeasible in most developing countries because they are expensive. Most related evidence
in developing countries is often based on very short interventions and small samples (see
Baker-Henningham and López Bóo (2010); Nores and Barnett (2010) for a literature re-
view). Few studies focus on longer treatment and long-term child outcomes. Exceptions
are Watanabe et al. (2005) and Kagitcibasi et al. (2009), both providing evidence of pos-
itive effects on cognitive outcomes, while Kagitcibasi et al. (2009) find positive effects on
other socio-economic outcomes. For example, children exposed to an early treatment en-
tered the workforce later (due to longer schooling) and found jobs of a higher status as
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young adults.
Another related study is Rosero and Oosterbeek (2011), which evaluates the effect of
home visits and child care centers on mothers and children in Ecuador. Child care centers
provide day care for the whole day throughout the entire year, and groups of 8-10 children
are supervised by a trained teacher. Weekly home visits, each lasting about an hour, teach
mothers how to stimulate and nourish their children, in individual sessions if children are
younger than three, and in groups if children are older. Rosero and Oosterbeek (2011) find
that child care centers increase mothers’ labor force participation but have detrimental
effects on children’s cognitive and health outcomes, while they observe the opposite effects
for home visits. The early childhood development program that we study is more similar
to the home visits than to the child centers described above.3 However, while Rosero and
Oosterbeek (2011) can analyze short term treatment effects only4, we are able to explore
long term effects on the mother and children. Attanasio et al. (2014) also evaluate the
effects of a weekly home visit program in Colombia that targeted children 12-24 months
and lasted for 18 months. They find that enhancing mothers’ engagement with their
children positively affects their cognitive and socio-emotional domains through an increase
in parental investments and find no effects on mothers’ depression (Attanasio et al., 2014,
2015).
3.3 Background and Research Design
AVSI, the Association of Volunteers in International Service, is an international not-for-
profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) based in Milan, Italy. Founded in 1972, it
operates in 30 countries in Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East
and it runs more than 100 long-term projects. It started its activities in Ecuador in
2001, focusing on infant and child development and education. In 2005 an AVSI branch
3The main difference between the PelCa program and the home visits analyzed by Rosero and Ooster-
beek (2011) is that in the latter mothers with their children are visited in their homes once a week, and
individually if the child is younger than 3, while in the PelCa program mothers and children go to the
NGO twice a month and are taught in groups from the beginning.
4Data was collected after the children in the program were exposed to treatment during 21 months
(Rosero and Oosterbeek, 2011).
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was opened in Pisullí, a disadvantaged, urban neighborhood to the northwest of Quito.
In collaboration with Fundación Sembrar, a local non-profit organization, and the local
parish, AVSI funded a community development center where it implements a modified
version of PelCa. The program expanded rapidly, providing after-school programs and
other services to more than 700 children, youth and their families in 2013, with more than
50 members on the local staff.
3.3.1 The Intervention
PelCa is a preschool program targeted at parents of children age 5 and under, based
on group-parenting sessions. Fortnightly meetings are held in the NGO for small groups
(usually six-eight mothers – with their children), under the guidance of a family advisor. In
the first part of the meeting, children socialize with each other, playing games using didactic
materials, while parents read and discuss material about family education. In the second
part of the meeting, parents and children work together: they learn songs, educational
games and various development activities that parents can reproduce with their children
at home (e.g., reading books, playing with puppets, playing building games, etc.). The
family advisor gives every child a notebook of age-appropriate activities that focus on
different areas of development, and parents and children are expected to undertake these
activities in the two weeks between the program sessions. In the last part of the meeting,
the family advisors verify whether tasks that were assigned to the mothers in the previous
two weeks were completed. The family advisors then monitor the progress made by each
child, verify whether they have completed home assignments with the parent (e.g., by
having children show drawings, or having children answer questions based on a story that
was to be read to them by the parent). The family advisor gives each parent and child
reinforcement activities to perform at home in the next two weeks. These activities are
geared towards mothers and children achieving specific targets and goals.5 These NGO-set
goals are the basis for the outcomes that we evaluate in the paper.
Goals for the mother: Build self-confidence and self-awareness and a greater ability to
5The goals are taken from the NGO handbook in Spanish.
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relate to their environment and the people in their peer group; to build a sense of value in
oneself and in material assets.
At the personal level: awaken interest in life; assume responsibility through personal com-
mitment; enhance self-perception of own abilities and the capacity to take initiative; and
to give appropriate value to assets and saving.
At the level of relationships with the family and community: to take pleasure in dialogue,
patience and reflection; strengthen the level of involvement of each member of the family in
the light of existing dynamics; share between the couple the responsibility for the children’s
education; develop an attitude that favors the autonomy of children and teenagers; develop
relationships of intimacy and solidarity with the group in the meetings, and with neighbors
in the neighborhood.
Goals for the children: facilitate children’s integral growth in different areas of devel-
opment (psychometric, language, cognitive, socio-affective).
Families usually find out about the program via word of mouth or a poster outside
the NGO. If they express interest, AVSI employees visit the family at home to collect
information about the family circumstances, observe conditions at home, assess the need
for support, and identify family weaknesses and strengths. Children up to three years
old are eligible to enter the program (so that they can participate in the program for at
least two years). The mother commits to participating in fortnightly meetings and to
performing the assigned tasks at home. The selection process also takes into account the
family’s financial standing and the proximity of the home to the NGO sites where sessions
are held. Parents and children can remain in the program until the child is 12 years old but
once the child reaches five years of age they move to the NGO PelCa school program. The
application process for the PelCa pre-school program starts at the end of April and lasts
for two weeks. Approximately 50 families (the number can vary depending on funding for
that year) are selected to start the program in September.
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3.3.2 Design: choosing a comparison group
Our treatment group was selected from many applicants, and is made up of mothers who
enrolled in the PelCa preschool program and their children, who are now in primary school.
In the summer of 2012, we selected a control group by mimicking the program’s selection
process, but on a larger scale. The NGO advertised the PelCa program in schools and
through posters, as had been done previously in the program. However, it extended the
application period to approximately two months to reach as many families as possible, and,
indeed, attracted a much larger pool of applicants compared to other years. We selected
applicant families with a preschool-age child and, similar to our treated mothers, at least
one child enrolled in primary school. The identifying assumption is that the sample of
mothers with children of primary school age who did not participate before in PelCa but
chose to do so now with a younger child, represents a sound counterfactual for PelCa
mothers and their primary-school-age children.
The families making up the control and treatment groups were invited to an interview
in June-July 2012. The mother participated in a structured interview, while her primary
school children were tested for cognitive and non-cognitive skills. The mother was asked to
bring her children’s vaccination certificate and birth certificate, which includes a record of
the child’s birth height, weight and head circumference and the older child’s school report
cards for the previous and current years. We then selected from among the applicants,
those who had an older child at a primary school age. We also held a follow up interview
with these control and treatment groups a year later in the summer of 2013.
3.4 Data
The data were collected through face-to-face interviews with mothers and children, using a
questionnaire we developed specifically for this study.6 The questionnaire seeks information
6We piloted the survey questionnaire in January 2012, interviewing 23 treated mothers: 12 of them
had a primary-school-age child who participated in the PelCa preschool program and 11 of them had a
primary-school-age child who did not participate in the PelCa program. We revised the questionnaire
following this pilot test.
94
Chapter B §3.4. Data
on family members (mother, partner and children), demographic characteristics, labor-
market activities (type of job, full-time/part-time, formal/informal sector, wage, etc.),
intra-household decision-making, and parents’ inputs into child rearing. All questions
targeted information current or prior to enrollment in the program.7 The interview lasted
approximately 45 minutes. The mother then took the Big Five Personality Test8 and the
Rosenberg self-esteem scale.9
Each child took cognitive tests in Spanish and mathematics.10 Data on weight, height
and head circumference at birth of the school age children were gathered through vaccina-
tion certificates and birth certificates. For some children, this information was incomplete
or unavailable.
The control group for 2012 was 164 children and 115 mothers, while the treatment
group was 219 children and 166 mothers, a total of 383 children and 281 mothers. We
interviewed some grandmothers who participated in the program on behalf of the mothers,
but we excluded these families from the analysis because we do not have grandmothers in
the comparison group.
In summer 2013, we conducted follow-up interviews. Ten female interviewers from the
area conducted home visits with all of the mothers in the sample. To obtain comparable
information in the two rounds of data collection we used the same questionnaire, but with
slight modifications. Some questions were added in order to clarify issues we encountered in
the 2012 data. However, where we introduced new questions, we also sought retrospective
information. Mothers were asked to bring the vaccination and birth certificates again
(because many of these documents had been missing in the previous year). Eventually
7We will provide details about the questionnaire upon request.
8The Big Five Personality Test is based on decades of research. It consistently evaluates five broad
traits of personality through a series of questions: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion,
agreeableness, and neuroticism. In 1981 these factors became known as the “Big Five” to indicate the
broad dimensions to which they refer. It has since been used intensely.
9The Rosenberg test, developed in 1965 by Dr. Morris Rosenberg, includes 10 Likert-type questions
and it is used to evaluate the self-esteem of an individual and is widely used today by psychologists,
sociologists, and social scientists. It has been translated into various languages (e.g., French, Norwegian,
Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, and Italian).
10Grade specific language and mathematics tests were constructed based on national tests from Ecuador,
known as “pruebeas SER (Sistema de Evaluación y Rendición de la Educación)” and on Peruvian national
tests for grades for which Ecuadorian tests were not available.
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we collected data on height at birth for 44 percent of the children, weight at birth for
41 percent, and head circumference at birth for 38 percent. We think that the extent
of missing values for these variables preclude a meaningful analysis of this information.
Mothers were also asked to bring children’s school report cards for 2010-11 and 2011-
12.The children were tested again in Spanish and mathematics, using tests appropriate
for the student’s school grade. The follow-up sample included 136 control children (83
percent) and 98 control mothers (85 percent), and from the treatment group, 197 children
(90 percent) and 150 mothers (90 percent).
3.4.1 Treatment-Control Comparisons: Balancing Tests
We examine in this section whether pre-treatment covariates are balanced between treat-
ment and control groups. The evidence suggests that mothers and children in both groups
are very similar on observed and predetermined characteristics, supporting our view of
the empirical setup as a quasi-natural experiment. The first two columns of Tables 3.1-3.2
display the means for the treatment and control groups, while the last two columns present
the difference in means between the two groups and the standard error.
Mothers’ characteristics (Table 3.1) are balanced in most of the dimensions, except that
control mothers were more likely to be employed before joining the program: 47.0 percent
of treated mothers were working versus 60.9 percent of control mothers. Control mothers
were also more likely to be working full-time. Pre-treatment paternal characteristics and
most of the household characteristics are well balanced,11 with a few exceptions: whether
the family owned a house, the number of rooms and the availability of drinkable water
in the house. Overall, 3 of the 33 pre-treatment maternal characteristics differences are
significantly different at 10 percent level of significance. This is less than 10 percent. The
F-test on the bottom of Table 3.1 on all of the pre-treatment maternal characteristics12
is also not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the imbalance in the pre-
program employment status of the mothers is an exception. We will however include in
11Details are provided in the Table C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix.
12Pre-treatment characteristics related to intra-household decisions before treatment are included.
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the regressions pre-treatment control variables to capture these differences between the
treatment and control groups. It will be shown that the estimates are not sensitive to
adding these controls.
With respect to the child characteristics (Table 3.2), control group children are half a
year older on average. This is probably due to the fact that we selected children from 1st
to 7th grade and that, as we will see, control children are more likely to repeat a grade and
therefore be older at survey date. The F-test on the significance of all the characteristics
together suggests that overall children’s characteristics are not linearly correlated with
treatment status.
3.4.2 Entropy Balancing
An alternative way to control for the differences in some of the pre-treatment characteristics
is to use entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2011). Entropy balancing is a data-preprocessing
method to achieve covariate balance. It computes the means (or higher moments of covari-
ate distributions) of the covariates in the treatment group and looks for a set of entropy
reweights so that the means in the reweighted control group match the means in the treat-
ment group. We implement entropy balancing for the means of the covariates that we
will include as control variables in our analysis (child and household pre-treatment eco-
nomic characteristics).13 Entropy balancing makes the treatment-control covariate balance
almost perfect: differences in means are not significantly different from zero for all covari-
ates (Table C.3).14 This approach is preferred over a propensity score matching because
the former eliminates all treatment-control imbalances. In addition, the propensity score
matching requires treated and controlled units to be comparable within the common sup-
port. As a consequence, the individuals who do not lie in the common support (5 out of
281 mothers in 2012 and 22 out of 496 mothers in the pooled data) are dropped from the
sample.15
13We also include an indicator of whether mothers were working full-time before treatment.
14We also obtain balanced samples through entropy balancing when we consider the children’s samples
or when we pool the two years of data together.
15 For purposes of robustness, we also re-estimated the effects of the program through a propensity score
matching, with and without replacement, and the results are very similar to the estimates we present in
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3.5 Empirical Strategy and Results
We estimate the effect of participating in the program on the outcomes of interest using
the following regression model:
yit = β0 + β1Treatmenti + β2ChildCharacteristicsi
+β3HouseholdDemographicsi + β4HouseholdEconomicsi
+β5TimeFEt + β6SchoolFEi + εit (..)
where i is the individual and t is time. yit is a vector of maternal and child outcomes
of interest. Since we face a multiple outcomes problem, we will also compute summary
indices16,17 for domains of outcomes. Treatmenti is a dummy equal to 1 when mother and
child participate in the PelCa program and 0 otherwise. To shed light on heterogeneous
treatment effects by number of years of participation in the program, we will also use
the specification outlined above with a linear effect of number of years a mother/child
participated in the program. Exposure to the program varies from two years and four
months to seven years and eleven months.
ChildCharacteristicsi includes year of birth, birth order, number of siblings as of
2005, i.e. before the program started, and gender. HouseholdDemographicsi are pre-
treatment household demographic characteristics: mother’s and father’s age, their civil
status (married, lived together, mother was single) at the time of the birth of the first
child, and the parents’ level of education before the birth of the first child, a dummy equal
to 1 if the mother was born in Quito, a dummy equal to 1 if the parents came from the
same city, and the number of children the mother had in 2005. HouseholdEconomicsi
the paper (these results are available upon request).
16We followed Kling et al. (2007) to construct each summary index as an “equally weighted average of
z-scores of its components, with the sign of each measure oriented [...] so that more beneficial outcomes
have higher scores. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the
control group standard deviation.”
17We developed a Stata package “mseffect” to calculate the mean effect size on the summary index with
the advantage that we account for different weights, reversibility of outcome sign, and different types of
robust standard errors.
98
Chapter B §3.5. Empirical Strategy and Results
are pre-treatment household economic characteristics: whether the mother worked before
treatment, whether the father worked, the mean firm size of mother’s and father’s employer,
average monthly family income before treatment. TimeFEt is a dummy equal to 1 when
the observation corresponds to 2013, 0 if 2012; is the error term, clustered at the mother
level when we run regressions pooling the observations in the two years together or when
we analyze outcomes for children. SchoolFEi are school fixed effects.18 They are included
when we analyze outcomes for children. A more detailed description of the control variables
is provided in the Appendix.19
3.5.1 Results based on Summary Indices
As we note in Section 3.3.1, the primary purposes of the PelCa program are to empower
mothers, harmonize intra-family relations, and increase investment in education in early
childhood. The breadth of the goals implies that the consequences of the program can
be measured in multiple domains. We decide to measure the following domains, each of
which contains multiple outcomes for mothers and children. For mothers, the domains
(and specific outcomes) are: labor-market outcomes (whether working, working full-time,
working with a contract and average family monthly income), mothers’ economic and
social independence (whether she has control over her own money, participates in volun-
tary activities, is currently studying and whether she has a role in her own employment
decisions), mothers’ intra-household decision-making (role in decisions regarding child’s
education, health, and discipline, expenditures in general and on food, having children,
use of contraceptives, own health), mothers’ child investment (own time inputs with child,
aspirations/expectations for child’s education), mothers’ self-esteem and Big Five personal-
ity traits (Rosenberg scale, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and
openness to experience). Summary statistics on the domains indices and individual out-
comes are presented in Table 3.3, in panel A for mother’s labor market outcomes, in panel
B for mother’s economic and social independence outcomes, in panel C for mother’s role
1855 are the number of schools that children attend in 2012.
19In a later version of this paper, we have tried different specifications with control variables.
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in intra-household decision making, in panel D for mother’s child’s investment, in panel E
for mother’s non-cognitive skills and fertility choices, and in panel F for the father’s labor
market outcomes.
For children, the domains (and outcomes) are: test scores (language and mathematics
test score), school dropout and grade repetition, attitude towards schooling (whether child
likes school, whether child feels he is expected to follow certain behavioral rules and whether
the child chose a book as gift20).
Before presenting the detailed estimates of the effects on each specific outcome, we
analyze each domain by creating domain-specific summary indices. This allows us to
control for the potential problem of over-rejection of the null hypothesis due to multiple
inference. Because different outcomes have different data scales, simply averaging the
estimators for the treatment effect is not likely to produce a meaningful statistic. To
address this concern, we follow the summary-index approach per Kling et al. (2007). The
summary index of multiple outcomes is the average of z-scores of each outcome variable.
Z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control mean from the outcome and dividing by
the control standard deviation. This summary index is a special case of the z-score21 and
is identical to the mean effect size of treatment if there is no missing value.22 In general,
20At the end of each interview, children were offered a gift. They could choose between a book and a
game. We interpret the choice of a book as interest in schooling activities.
21Here we replace the minuend and the divisor in the z-score by the control group mean and standard de-
viation respectively. In other words, we do require some dispersion in the controlled outcomes to guarantee
the validity of standardization.
22In the regression specification this approach yields standardized estimators as follows: the treatment
effects for K outcomes are aggregated and reflected in a single standard normal statistic,
τ =
1
K
∑
k
β1,k
σkC
k = 1, ...,K (..)
where β1,k indicates the average treatment effect for outcome k and σkC denotes the standard deviation of
the kth control outcome.Having included the covariates, the K average treatment effects (β1) and sample
variances can be easily acquired through a linear regression. By doing so, the above equation can be
thought of as a point estimator representing a collection of standardized treatment effects. However, this
paper also take account of the covariance of effects and therefore adapt a seemingly uncorrelated regression
(O’Brien, 1984; Kling et al., 2007):
Y = IK ⊗ (T X)β + v (..)
where T is the treatment indicator(s), and X consists of controlled regressors as well as a constant term.
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the sign of the summary index reveals information on the direction of the aggregate impact
of a class of outcomes, and the more the summary index deviates from zero, the stronger
is the implied aggregate effect.
Estimated effects on summary indices of mothers based on the 2012 data (panel A)
and on the pooled 2012-13 data (panel B) are presented in Table 3.4. We report estimates
from three different specifications, with only the treatment indictor as a covariate (column
1), with child and household demographic characteristics as controls (column 2) and with
the addition of household economic characteristics as additional controls. Based on the
fully specified regression (column 3), we conclude that the program enhances mother’s
participation in the labor market; the treatment effect on the corresponding summary
index based on the 2012 data is 0.482 (se=0.098) and based on the pooled 2012-13 data
it is 0.503 (se=0.098). These positive estimates are precisely measured and are practically
unchanged after controlling for child and household demographics (column 2) and for
economic covariates (column 3) as well. The entropy balancing estimates in columns 4-6
are very similar to the unweighted estimates presented in columns 1-3.
The corresponding treatment estimates on mothers’ economic and social independence
are also positive and large, 0.366 (se=0.076) when using the 2012 data and 0.276 (se=0.056)
when using the pooled 2012-2013 data. A similar positive treatment effect is evident for
the household decision-making outcomes, albeit the estimated coefficient for this summary
index is smaller, 0.126 based on the 2012 data and 0.093 based on the 2012-13 pooled
sample. The program encouraged an increase in parental investment in early child devel-
opment. The estimated effect on the overall index capturing these mothers’ investment is
positive and significant, 0.207, se=0.065. This positive effect is seen in improvements in
several measures of children’s outcomes (test scores, drop-out rates, repetition). It is possi-
ble that the better education outcomes for children were the result of other improvements
generated by the program, such as the increase in family income, and the direct training in
cognitive and non-cognitive skills that the children received in the biweekly meetings with
the family adviser. We will discuss this further when we present evidence of the effect of
the PelCa program on children.
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We note again that the estimates for these summary indices are robust to the inclusion
of control variables and also to a re-weighting with entropy balancing. Taken together,
these results suggest that we can gain further insights by examining in detail the effect
on the mothers’ outcomes. However, we do not find a strong average treatment effect on
mothers’ self-esteem and on personality traits (openness to experience, conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism): the estimated effect on the summary index of
these aspects is small (0.045) and not precisely measured.23 This contrasts with Kabeer
(2001), who finds that access to credit improves women’s self-esteem. However, our find-
ings do not necessarily imply the absence of a treatment effect on self-esteem or personality
traits, as it could also be that the instruments used to measure these outcomes were not
the most appropriate.
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Next, to gain more insight into the treatment effects on mothers, we explore treatment
heterogeneous effects. Table 3.5 presents the aggregate-estimated effect on the summary
indices with control for all covariates and for subsamples of mothers based on the 2012
data. We first examine the subsamples of mothers by pre-treatment working conditions:
this evidence is presented in columns 1-2 of Table 3.5. Among the group of treated mothers,
148 reported that they were working when their interviewed child was born, and 133
reported they were not working at that time. Our estimates indicate that the program had
larger effect on labor market outcomes of mothers who were not working before joining
PelCa, 0.794 (se=0.191) versus 0.340 (se=0.126), the F-test strongly rejecting that they
are equal (at 5 percent significance level).
For intra-household decisions, the same pattern emerges between the two treated sub-
samples. Although the F-statistic is less significant, the estimated effect for mothers who
were not working before PelCa is greater, 0.213 versus 0.086, respectively. The program
has the same effect for the two groups’ summary measure of economic and social indepen-
dence outcomes (0.351 and 0.484, respectively). Interestingly, the average effect on child
23When we evaluate the effects on a summary index for fertility choices separately we find no effects.
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investment comes mainly from the effect among mothers who worked at baseline (0.373)
with practically no effect among mothers who did not work before enrolling in the program.
The mothers with a higher pre-program employment rate might have had a more enriched
upbringing, which complemented the knowledge about child rearing acquired during the
program.
In columns 3-4, we present estimates by sub-samples stratified by mother’s pre-program
educational attainment (up to/more than primary school education). These are almost
equal samples, 144 and 136, respectively. The treatment effect on the labor market index
for the higher education mothers is 0.611 (se=0.163), versus 0.462 (se=0.130) in the lower
education sample, both estimates being statistically significant. A similar heterogeneous
pattern is seen in the effect on mother’s role in family decision-making, larger for the more
educated mothers, 0.205 (se=0.087) versus 0.098 (se=0.076), though the difference is not
statistically significant. We find a similar effect size on the summary index of all mothers’
economic and social independence outcomes for both groups (0.420 vs. 0.386). The effect
on child investment is strikingly different however for the two groups, 0.320 (se=0.105) for
less-educated mothers and 0.070 (se=0.100), for more educated mothers, and the difference
is statistically significant. One possible explanation is that mothers with lower education
levels are less skilled in child rearing and hence have higher marginal benefits from their
participation in the PelCa program.
Next, we explored heterogeneous treatment effects by mothers’ pre-treatment role in
decision-making. We expect that mothers who initially (before 2005) were less involved in
family decision-making would benefit more from the program.24 The estimates in Table
3.5, columns 5-6, suggest that this group had larger gains in the labor market and in
household decision-making. With respect to the latter effect, the difference is striking,
0.197 (se=0.073) versus -0.017 (se=0.083).
We next examine heterogeneity in the treatment effects by child gender. The results
24We made use of pre-treatment variables of mothers’ intra-household decisions. After calculating the
number of total household decisions that mothers made in 2005, we divide the full sample into two by the
mean of total decisions. In the 2012 sample of mothers there are 179 and 93 mothers who made more
decisions and fewer decisions respectively.
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are presented in Table 3.6. Based on 2012 data, the treatment effect on labor market
outcomes does not vary by the child gender, 0.534 for mothers of boys vs. 0.500 for
mothers of girls. The effect on child investment is larger for boys (0.268 vs. 0.193) but the
difference is not statistically significant. Interestingly, mothers of boys have also a larger
and significant treatment effect on the score in the Rosenberg self-esteem scale test and
the Big Five Personality Traits test (0.177 vs. -0.021). However, mothers of girls have
larger treatment effects on intra-household decision-making (0.161, significant at 5 percent
level, versus 0.079 and not significant) and on economic and social independence outcomes
(0.471, significant at 1 percent level, versus 0.323, significant at 1 percent level).
In the rest of the paper we will study which specific mother’s and child’s outcomes drive
the response of our aggregate measures. First we will present and discuss estimates based
on the full sample, with and without the pre-treatment covariates. Second, we will check
if our results hold when the sample is reweighted through entropy balancing. Finally, we
will perform other robustness checks.
3.5.2 Estimated Effects on Mothers’ Specific Outcomes
Labor-Market Outcomes
The estimates based on the 2012 data are presented in panel A of Table 3.7 and those
based on the pooled 2012-13 data are presented in panel A of Table 3.8. Labor-market
outcomes reflect the empowerment and emancipation of women. As we pointed out in
the previous section, the effect on the summary index in Table 3.4 suggests an overall
significant improvement in mothers’ employability and family income, and the evidence in
Tables 3.7-3.8 strengthens this conclusion. Treated mothers are 17.6 percent more likely
to be working, 20.7 percent more likely to be working full-time and 20.4 percent more
likely to be working in the formal sector. These estimated effects relative to the untreated
mothers are an increase of 36 percent, 130 percent and 230 percent, respectively, indicating
a large increase in mothers’ employability.25 Results based on the pooled 2012-13 data are
25The types of jobs that treated mothers hold are typically low-skilled jobs: mainly domestic cleaners,
but also seamstresses and shopkeepers. More details on the job categories are available upon request.
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very similar. All these estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1
percent significance level, and they are not affected by adding any of the control variables
in the regression. Moreover, we find that treated mothers have more stable employment:
69 percent of the working mothers from the program were working in both 2012 and 2013,
whereas only 49 percent of the working mothers in the control group were working in both
years.
Another important result in Table 3.7 shows that the 2012 average monthly income
of treated families is $44.48 higher than the families in the control group – a finding that
we attribute largely to increased wages for mothers. The median wage of workers in the
neighborhood is the minimum wage ($292 per month in 2012) and, therefore, the income
gain from the program is large. In 2013 we collected the data on mothers’ wages. Using
this information we estimate that family income is up mainly because of an increase in
mothers’ wages: treated mothers earn $13.33 (se=4.87) more per week than control moth-
ers, i.e. more than $57 extra per month (Table 3.8, panel A), while fathers’ wages are not
significantly different in the two groups. Our result of a significant impact on mothers’
wages without any similar effect on the spouse is in contrast to the findings reported in
Rosero and Oosterbeek (2011) who study the effect of child care centers on labor market
outcomes of mothers. They report an estimated increase in the likelihood that a mother is
working by 22 percent26 and of household income by $80,27 but unlike in the PelCa pro-
gram the latter is not driven by a rise in mothers’ earnings, but by the partners’ income.
Actually Rosero and Oosterbeek (2011) even find that home visits reduce the proportion
of mothers working by 17 percent, while leaving mothers’ income unaffected; however, we
note that our study is based on a longer term follow up and that the long term effect of
the home visits program might be different than the short term effect reported in Rosero
and Oosterbeek (2011).
26The child care centres’ effect on mothers’ employability is stronger than the PelCa program effect (22
percent vs. 16.4 percent), but it goes in the same direction.
27Please note that household income in Rosero and Oosterbeek (2011) is measured in 2007, while in the
current analysis it is measured in 2013, making the two incomes not perfectly comparable.
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Economic and Social Independence
As seen from Table 3.4, the effect on mothers’ independence from an economic and
social perspective is very large. The evidence presented in panel B of Tables 3.7 and 3.8
shows that treated mothers in 2012 are 21.3 percent (se=0.056) more likely to manage
their own money. Relative to the control group mean (44.7 percent), this is a 47.7 percent
increase. Again, these effects are unchanged when we add to the regression each set of
control variables and when we expand the sample to include also the 2013 data.
Another sign of the program’s effect on women’s empowerment is a larger proportion
(8.1 percent more, se=0.036) of treated mothers who are studying at the survey date, which
is about 155 percent higher than the rate of mothers in the control group. This estimate
is significant at the 5 percent level and is unchanged even after adding all the control
variables. When using the pooled 2012-13 data, the treatment effect on this outcome is
8.5 percent (se=0.031). A concern may be that entering the job market may lower the
incentives and time for studying, and mothers who participated in the program were more
likely to be working. To address this issue, we check whether mothers who quit studying
in 2013 also found a job in 2013; we find little evidence of such correlation.
More evidence of the program’s effect on women’s empowerment is based on the pro-
gram effect on mothers’ role in the decision whether she can work. In the 2012 survey, we
asked the mother who decides whether she can work. Treated mothers were 13.2 percent
(se=0.044) more likely to report that this decision is taken by themselves or jointly with
their partner. The estimated impact relative to the control group is 16.4 percentage points
higher. This holds true when we pool data from the 2012 and 2013 surveys: treated moth-
ers are 10.4 percent (se=0.031) more likely to have a role in this decision. Both estimates
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Here as well, adding controls and using
a weighted regression does not move the point estimates at all.
Household Decision-Making
Treated mothers are more likely to make decisions alone or with their partners about
issues related to children’s education (9.9 percent effect, significant at the 1 percent level)
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and on children’s discipline (8.7 percent effect, significant at the 5 percent level), which are
11.6 and 10.4 percent greater, respectively, than the outcome means of control mothers.
These estimated effects remain unchanged when controls are added. In the 2012 and
2013 pooled data, we estimated similar effects. However, we find no effect on the other
domains (intra-household decisions on spending, on having children, on contraceptives and
on what to do when children are ill). In the follow-up survey in 2013, we also collected
intra-household decision outcomes on who decides on issues related to mothers’ health,
on purchasing important items and on whether mothers can visit friends and relatives.
Effects on these intra-household decisions are non-conclusive. When stratifying the sample
by length of participation in the program (Tables C.10-C.11), we find that mothers who
have been in the program for a longer period of time are more likely to be involved in
household decision-making.
Together with the results based on the single-treatment dummy, it seems safe to con-
clude that mothers participating in the PelCa program assume greater intra-household
responsibilities and participate more fully in intra-household decision-making.
Access to credit was also found to have a positive effect on women’s power in household
decision-making, for decisions related to the loan (Kabeer, 2001, 2005). The effect of access
to credit seems higher than what we find here. However, this might be due to the lower
initial power of women who received the loan in the analysis by Kabeer (2001, 2005), where
20 percent of women in the comparison group had some sort of role in decision-making,
compared to the women in our study, where even before the treatment, 70/80 percent of
women had some power within the household.
Mothers’ Child Investments
The program is intended to improve children’s outcomes by enhancing investments
in children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills. We therefore asked mothers in the 2012
survey how much time per week they spend interacting with their children in a variety of
activities. Table 3.11 presents evidence on forms of child investment that we aggregated
in the overall respective index. The PelCa program enhanced three of the four types of
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maternal investment that we considered. The estimates show that treated mothers are
more likely to have conversations with children (4 percent effect, significant at 5 percent
level) and also more likely to listen to and talk to their children about the books or other
material they read (10 percent effect, significant at 5 percent). Treated mothers also
invest more time in playing educational leisure games (for example dancing) with children
(6.6 percent effect, se=0.025). We find no similar effects on mothers going to the library
regularly with children (2 percent effect, se=0.040).
Taken together, the results suggest that participation in the PelCa program has in-
creased mothers’ investment in their children, in the form of increased mother-child edu-
cational interaction and recreational activities. In the next section we will report positive
effects of the PelCa program on children’s schooling outcomes and we view the above ev-
idence on maternal investment as indication of a possible mechanism through which the
program might have improved child development. These reduced form effects are similar to
findings about the effect of a home visiting program in Colombia that increased varieties of
play materials and play activities in the home and also improved children’s cognitive, lan-
guage and socio-emotional development (Attanasio et al., 2014). Using a structural model,
Attanasio et al. (2015) provide evidence that directly links these parental investments in
children to the children’s improved cognitive outcomes.
Treatment Effect by Number of Years in the Program
We estimated the treatment effect where exposure is measured by number of years in
the program. This specification imposes a linear effect of years in the program. We prefer
this specification over estimating separate regressions using stratified samples by number
of years in the program because of sample size considerations. The number of years that
mothers in our sample participated in the program ranges from two to seven and the mean
is 5.5 years. We note that when using a linear effect specification of years in the program
as a treatment measure, the summary index cannot be calculated because the treatment
variable is no longer binary. In Table C.8 and C.9 we report the linear effect estimate
for each of the mothers’ outcomes. Most of the estimates are positive and significantly
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different from zero. The pattern of positive or no effects in these two tables is consistent
with the estimates we present in earlier tables. For example, the intensity of treatment
measured as number of years in the program has no effect on mothers’ role in decision
making regarding food expenditure, having children and use of contraceptives (Table C.8),
which is exactly in line with the evidence presented in Tables 3.8-3.9, where we use a simple
indicator of program participation as a measure of treatment.
Next, we re-estimated the effect on mothers’ and children’s outcomes by two subsamples
– whether the treated enrolled in the program before 2007 or from 2007. Enrollment in
early years is positively correlated with the length of time mothers were in the program,
and therefore it is an alternative approach to assess the effect of treatment intensity. The
resulting estimates are reported in panels A of Tables C.10-C.11. Overall, the estimated
effects on labor market outcomes, mothers’ economic and social independence and mothers’
care of children are larger for early participants than participants who joined later. For
example, the effect on probability of making intra-household decisions among mothers
who joined the program early is 0.195, while for later participants (from 2007) this effect
is small and non-significant. The results based on the pooled sample of 2012 and 2013
present a similar pattern. The results presented in Tables C.12-C.13 suggest that the
effect on children’s overall summary indices for mothers who started the program before
2007 is positive and significant (0.138, se=0.063), whereas it is smaller and not significant
for mothers who enrolled in the program later (0.109, se=0.094). However, we cannot
reject the possibility that the two estimates are not statistically different from each other.
3.5.3 Effect on Children’s Outcomes
The estimated effect of the program on children’s outcomes are presented in Table 3.12.
In the first row we present the program impact on summary index of children’s outcomes
and in rows 2-4 we present the estimates on the specific outcomes that make this index.
The effect on the summary index is based on fewer observations than the sample size of
each of the detailed outcomes because there are missing values for some of these outcomes,
mostly for test scores, because not all the children were tested in both subjects. The
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estimated effect on the summary index of children’s outcomes is positive and significant,
0.144 (se=0.058), suggesting that children are positively affected by participating in the
PelCa program. We note again that this estimate is not sensitive at all to adding child,
household demographics and household economics controls, nor to the entropy balancing.
The estimated effect on the average of the test scores in Spanish language and math-
ematics is 0.115 (se=0.103) when including all the controls. This implies that treated
children have marginally higher school performance. This effect becomes clearer when we
divide the children’s sample by gender. Table 3.13 reports the heterogeneous effects on
children’s outcomes by gender and mothers’ education. In columns 1 and 2, the estimated
summary indices are based on 191 girls and 192 boys, separately. The PelCa program
increased girls’ average test score by 0.378 (se=0.144) and boys’ by 0.012 (se=0.147). The
effect on girls is larger and precisely measured and the difference between the two groups
is statistically significant. The F-test statistic for this difference is 3.146, significant at
10% level. These results are different from Rosero and Oosterbeek (2011), who do not find
significant gender differences in the (positive) treatment effects of home visits on children’s
cognitive outcomes. The High Scope Perry Preschool program however had stronger effects
on female students Heckman et al. (2013).
We also estimated the program effect on this cognitive outcome when we stratified the
child sample by the mother’s educational levels. The results are presented in Table 3.13,
columns 3-4. We divide the full sample of children into two groups according to whether
their mothers had completed primary school; our data show that 207 mothers finished up
to primary school, and 176 mothers have more than primary education. The estimates
in columns 3-4 suggest that the effect of the program on this cognitive index is higher
for children of less educated mothers (0.341, se=0.117). The respective estimated effect
on children with more educated mothers is actually negative though imprecisely measured
(-0.193, se=0.154). F-statistics for group differences in the treatment effects are reported
in square brackets and show that the estimated impacts for the two groups are significantly
different. The negative effect on children of more educated mothers could be related to
the higher employment rate of these mothers before and after they joined the program and
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also to the lower increase in child investment during the program. We have noted above
the lower gain in early childhood investment in children of educated mothers that could be
explained by the small impact the program had on time inputs of these mothers into child
rearing. The estimates presented in Table 3.13 columns 5-6 provide additional support
for this explanation. In these columns we present program effect on stratified samples by
mother’s pre-program employment status and find that the effect of the program on test
scores was much higher for the sample of children whose mother did not work at baseline,
0.302 (se=0.180) versus -0.092 (se=0.122).
The effect size on children’s dropout rates and grade repetition presented in Table
3.12 is -0.192 (se=0.082) in a specification without covariates; it practically remained
unchanged, -0.182 (se=0.073), when adding all the relevant controls, clearly indicating
that treated children generally have improved educational attainment due to the program.
The estimates presented in Table 3.13 suggest that impacts on girls’ dropout rate or grade
repetition (-0.256, se=0.089) are larger than on boys’ (-0.087, se=0.116), and the difference
is marginally significant. The negative effect on these outcomes is in line with evidence from
other pre-school early childhood programs such as the Abecedarian project, the High Scope
Perry Preschool program and the Chicago Child-Parent Centers, where grade retention is
significantly lowered for treated students (Nores et al., 2005; Temple and Reynolds, 2007).
The estimated effect on children’s attitude towards schooling is small and imprecise (0.026,
se=0.071). However, when the sample is stratified by gender, the estimate is positive on the
attitude toward schooling among male participants. The estimated effect on this index is
0.142 (se=0.097) for boys, while the effect on girls is small (0.008) but with large standard
error.
3.6 Robustness Checks
Evidence on Entropy Balancing: In this section we examine whether treatment effects
are robust to reweighting the sample with entropy balancing. The results after imposing
entropy balancing are reported in columns 4-6 of Tables 3.4, Tables 3.7-3.12 and appendix
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Tables C.3-C.6. With respect to mothers’ outcomes, we also calculate summary indices
for the reweighted sample. The estimated effects on the indices of mothers’ labor-market
outcomes, independence and household decision-making exhibit similar patterns to those
previously reported. The estimated impacts on summary indices tend to suggest a slightly
larger overall effect on mothers’ employment in 2012 (0.577 vs. 0.482 in Table 3.7). How-
ever, the 95 percent confidence interval with re-weighting (0.388, 0.766) overlaps with the
confidence interval without re-weighting. The pooled data in Table 3.8 tell the same story.
When it comes to disaggregated labor-market outcomes of mothers, the estimated param-
eters remain roughly the same: in 2012 treated mothers are 21.6 percent more likely to
be working (the estimated coefficient in the reweighted sample is slightly higher than in
the sample without reweighting, where we estimated a 17.6 percent increase), 23.4 percent
more likely to be working full-time (20.7 percent without reweighting), and 22.0 percent
more likely to be working in the formal sector (20.4 percent without reweighting). These
estimates are not statistically different from the estimates in the original sample. The same
pattern is observed regarding the estimated effects on average monthly family income in
2012, and mothers’ wage in 2013.
The estimated effect on mother’s independence does not change much either when we
use the entropy re-weighting. Treated mothers are 20.5 percent more likely to control their
own money, consistent with the 22.2 percent likelihood we found earlier. The effects of
the program on other outcomes are also similar to previous results: treated mothers in
the reweighted sample are approximately 9.5 percent more likely to be studying in 2012
or 2013 or both, and they are about 11.6 percent more likely to participate in making
the decision on their job status. We find small effects on mothers’ engagement in social
voluntary activities. Again, the confidence interval at 1 percent for economic and social
independence outcomes based on the reweighted sample overlaps greatly with the estimates
using the original sample.28
The estimated effects on intra-household decision-making also exhibit the same pattern
with entropy re-weighting: positive effect on mother’s power in decisions on children’s
28This is true both for 2012 data and the pooled data.
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education and children’s discipline (columns 4-6 in Tables 3.9-3.10) and no significant effect
on other decision-making outcomes. The estimated aggregate effect on intra-household
decision-making in 2012 is 0.124 (statistically significant at the 1 percent level), which is,
again, almost identical to the previous result without re-weighting (0.126). In the pooled
data, the estimated effects on the indices using the weighted data are smaller and less
significant, which is consistent with our finding using the unweighted data, partly because
the effects on the additional outcomes in the panel data are negligible.
The estimated effects on mothers’ child investment are similar after we re-weighted the
sample. The magnitudes of coefficients on the summary index and the detailed outcomes,
albeit being statistically weaker, are still positive and remain within reasonable distance
of the unweighted estimates.
We present the estimated effects on the children sample adjusted by entropy balancing
in Table 3.12 (columns 4-6). We find the very same pattern that we found in the unadjusted
data. As before, the estimated treatment impact on children’s attitude towards schooling
is still vague. The estimates on test scores and educational attainment are also consistent
with those found in the original sample.
We also check whether improved women’s status hinders men’s status in the family.
Reassuringly, we find no evidence of a change in the economic status of fathers with entropy-
balancing either.
Attrition Analysis: A potential concern in our paper is attrition bias. Since mothers
can enroll in PelCa soon after their child’s first birthday and up to age 5, and then enroll
in the PelCa school program, participation in the program can be up to twelve years.
Mothers who remained in the program for longer may be different to mothers who decided
to leave earlier. Therefore, the sample of treated mothers might be different to the mothers
in the control group. To examine this potential threat to our identification strategy, we
take advantage of a sample of mothers and children who enrolled in the PelCa program
between 2004 and 2013 and left the program between 2005 and 2015. For this sample we
have information on mothers’ characteristics such as age, living status, working status and
highest educational level, and age of their child who was enrolled in the program. This
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sample includes 311 mothers and 430 children.
We first restricted this “attrite” sample to 172 mothers and 258 children who joined
the PelCa program during the same period that the treated mothers joined the program,
namely between 2005 and 2009. We find that the two groups are very well balanced in
terms of their pre-program characteristics (column 4 of Table C.7 in the appendix). This
result is unchanged even if we restrict further the attrite sample to mothers and children
who joined the program between 2005 and 2009 and left it after 4 years (column 5 of Table
C.7).
One important difference between the two samples is that all treated children have
reached primary school age by 2012 and moved to the school-PelCa program while 67 out
of 258 attrite children (25.97%) were still in the pre-school PelCa program. We therefore
limit further the attrite sample to mothers whose children were all in the school-PelCa
program when they left the program. The means of the pre-program characteristics of the
attrite group, the treatment group and the control group are presented in columns 1-3 of
Table 3.15. T-tests on pre-program differences of mothers’ pre-characteristics (mother’s
age, number of children in 2005, living status, working status and highest educational
level) and in child’s age before entering the program are well balanced at 10 percent level
of significance. The results of this comparison between the attrite and treatment groups
are presented in column 4 and the attrite and the control group in column 5. We think this
evidence suggests that the decision to leave the program is not correlated with observed
characteristics of mothers and children, which raises the likelihood that they are also
uncorrelated with their unobserved characteristics.
Additional Robustness Checks: Our analysis relies on the similarity between treat-
ment and control groups. However, we note that 10 percent of mother or child character-
istics were not balanced at the 10 percent significance level. We interpreted this difference
in pre-treatment observables characteristics as random, as might happened even in a ran-
domly assigned treatment and control groups. We think that the close similarity between
the control and treatment groups results from the similar self-selection of mothers into the
two groups, as both have shown their desire to participate in the program. In support of
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this identification approach we show below that mothers who decided to participate in the
program in 2012 did not participate before for reasons that do not affect the outcomes we
study. For example, we found some imbalance in mothers working status before joining or
showing interest in joining the program. We therefore re-do the analysis by subsamples:
first we analyze the treatment effects in the group of treated and control mothers who were
not working at baseline, and secondly in a sub-sample of treated and control mothers who
were working at baseline (2005). The estimated treatment effects obtained from these two
sub-samples are very similar and they are also very similar to the estimates we obtained
from the full sample. This evidence rules out the possibility that our results are driven by
non-comparable treatment and control groups in terms of employment rate at baseline.
It is still important, however, to understand why control group mothers did not enroll
in the program previously. From the Figure 3.2 in the appendix, we can see that a high
proportion of mothers did not enroll in the program because they did not know about
it (44.55 percent); about a quarter of mothers because they lived too far from the NGO
offices (25.74 percent); some had problems with their application forms, for example, losing
the forms (11.88 percent), and some because of a previous affiliations with other NGOs
in the area (8.91 percent). These responses exclude the possibility that mothers chose
not to enroll in the program because they questioned its effectiveness. We also note here
that none of these explanations are correlated with the previous working condition or with
working full-time before.
As a further robustness check, we re-estimate all models by limiting the sample to
the control mothers who did not enroll in the program either because they were already
affiliated with another NGO, or because there was a problem with their application forms.
The first group of control mothers, if anything, should be more attentive than treated
mothers. The second group can be interpreted as randomly assigned to the control group.
Unfortunately the sample here is very small (21 mothers): the estimated effects we obtain
from this sample are qualitatively similar to those obtained from the full sample, but they
are much less precisely estimated.
As a final robustness check, we also re-estimated the various models using propensity
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score matching (with replacement). The mean bias is reduced to 6.7 percent and the
median bias to 4.0 percent. The sample consists of 58 treated mothers and 90 control
mothers. We also estimate a propensity score matching without replacement: the mean
bias is reduced to 5.4 percent and the median bias to 5.0 percent. The sample consists of 90
treated mothers and 90 control mothers. As indicated above, we prefer entropy balancing
which allows for maintaining the sample size, even though when we reduce the sample size
through propensity score matching, we obtain very similar results.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze an innovative method to empower women and increase their
early childhood investment in their children. PelCa, a home-preschool program, placed
the mother at the center of her children’s education, and provided guidance and training
for achieving its goals. Relying on a ‘designed’ quasi-natural experiment, we are able to
identify and measure the effects of this program on both mothers and children after several
years of program participation.
First, we find that the intervention empowers women across different domains. It
facilitates their entry into the labor market: treated mothers are much more likely to be
working, more likely to be working full-time and more likely to be working in the formal
sector. All of these estimates are precisely measured and are robust to the inclusion of
covariates. Moreover, treated mothers become more financially independent and more
likely to manage and make spending decisions about their own money; to be studying; and
to decide whether they can work outside of the home. The results suggest that after joining
the PelCa program, mothers are also willing to spend more time interacting with their
children, on cognitive or social activities. The treatment further modifies the allocation of
power in the house: mothers become more likely to take part in decisions about children’s
education and discipline. However, we find no effect on mother’s role in decisions about
what to do when the child is ill, about various types of expenditures, about having children,
or the use of contraceptives. Treatment intensity plays a role here: the longer the mother
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stays in the program, the more empowered she becomes within the household. Moreover,
mothers who were less empowered at baseline are the ones who gain the most in terms of
advancing their role in decisions about the household and the allocation of resources.
All of the above results hold when we estimate aggregate treatment impacts, use sum-
mary indices instead of individual outcomes in order to account for multiple inference,
when we use entropy balancing to adjust for differences in pre-treatment covariates, and
when we use other robustness checks.
We also evaluate the program’s impact on children. We firstly examine children’s
cognitive tests. The estimated impact on the summary index of cognitive achievement of
treated children is positive but only marginally significant. But the average treatment effect
disguises meaningful heterogeneity. Girls in the program appear to make large positive
progress in test scores but there is no corresponding effect on boys; children whose mothers
have a lower educational attainment benefit much more from the program in terms of
improved cognitive tests than children of more educated mothers. Our findings also suggest
that there are differential treatment effects by mothers’ pre-treatment working status –
children with less-educated mothers at baseline (before enrolling in the program) show
more improvements in their cognitive testing.
Moreover, consistent with findings from other pre-school programs, students in the
PelCa program are much less likely to drop out of school or to repeat a grade. These
effects are marginally larger for female students, but the difference between genders is
not significant. Although we do not find a treatment effect on students’ attitudes toward
schooling, the overall summary index aggregating all children’s outcomes confirms that
children tend to be positively affected by participating in the PelCa program. Overall,
there is evidence that the home-preschool program that we study here helped mothers
raise their children in a more learning conducive environment, which led to positive effects
on children, as well as on empowering mothers at home and in the community.
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Appendix:
Construction of Control Variables
Household demographics controls
1. Mothers’ and fathers’ education (separately): Indicator variables (0/1) for whether
primary schooling not completed, primary schooling completed, secondary schooling
not completed, secondary schooling completed, and university schooling completed.
2. Mother age and Father age.
3. Mother personal status: Indicator variables (0/1) for whether the mother was mar-
ried, cohabited, or single.
4. Mother origin: An indicator (0/1) for whether the mother is from Quito.
5. Parents from same city: indicator (0/1).
6. Number of children in 2005.
Household economics controls
1. Mother working before child enrolled in PelCa: indicator=1, 0 otherwise.
2. Father working before child enrolled in PelCa: indicator=1, 0 otherwise.
3. Mother’s firm size if employed: (0, 1, 3.5, 8, 15.5, 35.5, 75.5, 300.5).
4. Father’s firm size if employed: (0, 1, 3.5, 8, 15.5, 35.5, 75.5, 300.5).
5. Family average income: before child enrollment in PelCa (0, 50, 200, 350, 450, 600,
800).
Child controls
1. Birth order (1,...,10).
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2. Child age (5,...,14).
3. Number of young siblings in 2005 (0,...,3).
4. School fixed effects
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Figures and Tables
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Figure 3.1: Identification Strategy
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Figure 3.2: Why control mothers did not enroll before in the program
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Table 3.1: Mothers’ Characteristics and Pre-program Outcomes
(2012)
Note. The numbers attached in columns 1-3 of the last row of the table indicate the numbers of
observations in the treated sample, control sample and the total sample, respectively. Statistics are
based on the 2012 survey of mothers. Standard errors are presented in parentheses in the column
(4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. An F-test on the overall significance of the pre-treatment
variables is shown at the end of the table. In a later version of the paper, we have tried different
specifications with control variables to ensure the robustness of the results.
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Table 3.2: Children’s Characteristics and Pre-program Outcomes
(2012)
Note. The numbers attached in columns 1-3 of the last row of the table indicate the numbers of observa-
tions in the treated sample, control sample and the total sample, respectively. Statistics are based on the
2012 survey of children. Standard errors are presented in parentheses in the column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. An F-test on the overall significance of the pre-treatment variables is shown at the end
of the table. In a later version of the paper, we have tried different specifications with control variables to
ensure the robustness of the results.
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Table 3.14: Correlations between Working Condition Before
Treatment and Reasons Why Control Mothers Did Not Apply
Note. Each cell reports the correlation coefficient based on the 2012 survey; * p < 0.05.
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Table 3.15: Characteristics and Pre-program Outcomes of the Usable Sam-
ple and the Sample of Mothers/Children who Enrolled between 2005 and
2009 and All Children were in the School-PelCa when They Left
Note. The column (1) is based on the sample of mothers/children who enrolled between 2005 and 2009 and all
children were in the School-PelCa program when they left. Columns (2) and (3) are based on the 2012 survey.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses in the column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A Appendices to Chapter 1
The appendix to the paper “How does the REF panel perceive journals? A new approach to
estimating ordinal response model with censored outcome” consists of three parts. Appendix
A.1 provides details of the calculation of the posterior means and posterior variances of
the GPA scores. In Appendix A.2, we provide detailed descriptive statistics based on
information from the REF 2014 assessment results and the SCImago Journal & Country
Rank in 2014. In Appendix A.3, we provide various plots for summarising and investigating
the MCMC posterior distributions.
A.1 Predicted GPA Scores of Each Institution
Let the individual output be labelled as i and the institution as j. Yi denotes the outcome
variable. We are interested in the GPA score for each institution, denoted as GPAj . This
can be written as the average GPA score of all individual outputs from the same institution:
GPAj =
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
GPAij
where GPAij indicates a particular output i from institution j and can be expressed as a
weighted average quantity by its definition:
GPAij = 1× I(Yi = 1) + 2× I(Yi = 2) + 3× I(Yi = 3) + 4× I(Yi = 4)
Before calculating the mean and variance of GPAij , we note that each indicator func-
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tion {I(yi = s), s = 1, ..., 4} in the above equation is essentially a Bernoulli variable. A
vector of the indicator functions hence forms a Multinomial distribution. In this spirit, we
assume that the random vector Zi =
(
I(Yi = 1), I(Yi = 2), I(Yi = 3), I(Yi = 4)
)′
fol-
lows a Multinomial distribution with a probability vector
(
pYi,1, pYi,2, pYi,3, pYi,4
)′, where
{pYi,s, s = 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates the probability of Yi being equal to s. Since Zi corresponds
to a single output, the number of the trial parameter of the Multinomial distribution is
exactly one. Thus, Zi ∼ Mult
(
1, (pYi,1, pYi,2, pYi,3, pYi,4)
′) has the following mean and
(co)variance expressions:
E(Zi) =
[
pYi,1, pYi,2, pYi,3, pYi,4
]′
Var(Zi) =
[
pYi,1(1− pYi,1), pYi,2(1− pYi,2), pYi,3(1− pYi,3), pYi,4(1− pYi,4)
]′
Covq,r = −pYi,qpYi,r for the qth and rth marginals of Zi; and q 6= j
By using the facts above, the mean and the variance of the GPAj for institution j can
be written as:
E(GPAj) =
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
E(GPAij)
=
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
pYi,1 + 2pYi,2 + 3pYi,3 + 4pYi,4
Var(GPAj) =
1
n2j
nj∑
i=1
Var(GPAij)
=
1
n2j
nj∑
i=1
(
pYi,1(1− pYi,1)}+ 4pYi,2(1− pYi,2)}
+9pYi,3(1− pYi,3)}+ 16pYi,4(1− pYi,4)}
−2[2pYi,1pYi,2 + 3pYi,1pYi,3 + 4pYi,1pYi,4
+6pYi,2pYi,3 + 8pYi,2pYi,4 + 12pYi,3pYi,4
])
where {pYi,s, s = 1, 2, 3, 4} in the above equation are estimated as a function of the posterior
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of θ = (β, c)′:
pYi,s := Pr(Yi = s|θ)
= Φ(cs − β′Di)− Φ(cs−1 − β′Di) for s = 1, 2, 3, 4 and i = 1, ..., nj
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A.2 Data Descriptive Statistics
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Table A.1: Number of Submissions to the REF Economics and Econometrics
Sub-Panel and the Business and Management Studies Sub-Panel
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cont..
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cont..
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cont..
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cont..
Source.— Column (1) uses data from the SCImago Journal & Country Rank published in 2014. Column
(2) uses data from the REF 2014 Economics and Econometrics Assessment Unit, and column (3) the REF
2014 Business and Management Studies Assessment Unit.159
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Table A.2: List of Abbreviations of Economics Journals in this Paper
AEJ American Economic Journal
AER American Economic Review
EER European Economic Review
EJ Economic Journal
IER International Economic Review
JAE Journal of Applied Econometrics
JDE Journal of Development Economics
JEEA Journal of European Economic Association
JET Journal of Economic Theory
JIE Journal of International Economics
JMCB Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
JME Journal of Monetary Economics
JPE Journal of Political Economy
JPubE Journal of Public Economics
REStud Review of Economic Studies
REStat Review of Economics and Statistics
QJE Quaterly Journal of Economics
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A.3 Further Information of MCMC out-
puts
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Table A.3: Various Estimates of the Parameters in the Probit
Model – Simulation Data
Note.—Column (1) presents true values in the data generating process. Columns (2)-(4) report
the estimated probit paramters based on simulation data: column (2) presents the frequentist
maximum likelihood estimates and column (3) reports the Bayesian MCMC estimates using the
Metropolis-Hasting sampler given known outcomes. Column (4) is based on the proposed algo-
rithm in which the outcome is treated as unknown. MLE standard errors or MCMC posterior
standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Figure A.1: Various Plots of Sampled Model Parameters from 5000 MCMC
Iterations of the Proposed Algorithm – Simulation Data
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Figure A.2: Various Plots of Sampled Cut-Off Points from 20,000 MCMC
Iterations of the Proposed Algorithm (Journal Dummies with More than
20 Submissions to the REF Economics and Econometrics Panel)
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Figure A.3: Various Plots of Sampled Cut-Off Points from 20,000 MCMC
Iterations of the Proposed Algorithm (Journal Dummies with More than
10 Submissions to the REF Economics and Econometrics Panel)
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Figure A.4: Various Plots of Sampled Cut-Off Points from 20,000 MCMC
Iterations of the Proposed Algorithm (Journal Dummies with More than
10 Submissions to the REF Business and Management Studies Panel)
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Figure A.5: Trace Plots (left), Correlograms (middle) and Histograms (right)
of Sampled Parameters of Journal Dummies from 20,000 MCMC Iterations
of the Proposed Algorithm (Journal Dummies with More than 20 Submis-
sions to the REF Economics and Econometrics Panel)
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
4 6 8 10 12
American Economic Review
 American Economic Review
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
2
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
3 4 5 6 7
Economic Journal
 Economic Journal
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
3
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
2 4 6 8
Journal of Econometrics
 Journal of Econometrics
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
4
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
2 3 4 5
Journal of Economic Theory
 Journal of Economic Theory
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5
Games and Economic Behavior
 Games and Economic Behavior
167
Appendix B A.1. Predicted GPA Scores of Each Institution
0.0
5.0
10.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
-0
.5
0
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
6
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
5
Pe
rc
en
t
2 4 6 8 10 12
Journal of the European Economic Association.
 Journal of the European Economic Association.
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
7
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
4 6 8 10 12 14
Econometrica
 Econometrica
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
8
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
4 6 8 10 12
Review of Economic Studies
 Review of Economic Studies
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
9
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Economics Letters
 Economics Letters
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
10
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
2 3 4 5 6
Review of Economics and Statistics
 Review of Economics and Statistics
168
Appendix B A.1. Predicted GPA Scores of Each Institution
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
-0
.5
0
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
11
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
2 4 6 8
Journal of Public Economics
 Journal of Public Economics
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
12
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5
European Economic Review
 European Economic Review
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
13
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5
Economic Theory
 Economic Theory
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
-0
.5
0
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
14
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
2
4
6
8
Pe
rc
en
t
0 5 10 15
Journal of Development Economics
 Journal of Development Economics
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
15
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
0 1 2 3 4 5
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
 Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
169
Appendix B A.1. Predicted GPA Scores of Each Institution
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
16
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
0 1 2 3 4
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
17
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
2
4
6
8
Pe
rc
en
t
0 5 10 15
Journal of Monetary Economics
 Journal of Monetary Economics
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
-0
.5
0
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
18
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
2 4 6 8 10
Journal of International Economics
 Journal of International Economics
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
19
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
0 2 4 6
Econometric Theory
 Econometric Theory
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
20
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5
Journal of Health Economics
 Journal of Health Economics
170
Appendix B A.1. Predicted GPA Scores of Each Institution
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
21
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5 6
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
22
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
4 6 8 10 12
Quarterly Journal of Economics
 Quarterly Journal of Economics
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
23
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5 6
International Economic Review
 International Economic Review
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
24
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
0 1 2 3 4 5
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
 Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
25
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5
Canadian Journal of Economics
 Canadian Journal of Economics
171
Appendix B A.1. Predicted GPA Scores of Each Institution
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
26
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
2 4 6 8 10
Journal of Applied Econometrics
 Journal of Applied Econometrics
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
27
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
0 1 2 3 4 5
Oxford Economic Papers
 Oxford Economic Papers
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
28
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
-1 0 1 2 3
Journal of Banking and Finance
 Journal of Banking and Finance
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
29
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
0 5 10 15
Journal of Political Economy
 Journal of Political Economy
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
30
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
Economics & Econometrics: unpublished
 Economics & Econometrics: unpublished
172
Appendix B A.1. Predicted GPA Scores of Each Institution
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
31
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5 6
Economics & Econometrics: book or book charpters
 Economics & Econometrics: book or book charpters
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
32
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
Economics & Econometrics: other articles
 Economics & Econometrics: other articles
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
50
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
33
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
5
Pe
rc
en
t
2 4 6 8
Other journals with SJR ranking Top 100
 Other journals with SJR ranking Top 100
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
34
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
1.5 2 2.5 3
Other journals with SJR ranking 101-1000
 Other journals with SJR ranking 101-1000
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
35
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
1 1.5 2 2.5
Other journals with SJR ranking 1001-3000
 Other journals with SJR ranking 1001-3000
173
Appendix B A.1. Predicted GPA Scores of Each Institution
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
36
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
t
.5 1 1.5 2
Other journals with SJR ranking 3001-6500
 Other journals with SJR ranking 3001-6500
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Iteration
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
s o
f b
37
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
0 .5 1 1.5
Other journals with SJR ranking Below 6500
 Other journals with SJR ranking Below 6500
174
B Appendices to Chapter 2
B.1 Applications to the Artificial Data
B.1.1 Exercise 1
In the first exercise, 500 observations used. (X1, X2, X3, X4) are generated from three
clusters, X4 is then transformed to a dummy variable by X4 = 1(X4 > 0). Then we assign
the treatment non-randomly based on a complicated relationship between covariates Xi
and the binary intake Ti. In particular, the assignment of treatment follows a student t ’s
distribution:
Pr(T = 1|X) = t3(2− 0.05(3(X1 − 0.5))3 + 1.2 sin(piX2
2
)
−2(0.05X3 − 10
10
)4 + 2X4)
Ti = 1 if U [0, 1] > Pr(Ti = 1|X)
and the potential outcomes are calculated by:
Control: Yi(0) = 0.25 + 0.3X1i + 0.4X2i + 1.8X3i − 0.4X4i +N (0, 1)
Treatment: Yi(1) = y0i + 2 + 1.2X1i + 1.4X2i + 2.8X3i + 0.4X4i +N (0, 1)
Hence, the true value ATT is E(Yi(1)|Ti = 1)− E(Yi(0)|Ti = 1) = 3.7122.
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Figure B.1: Cross-plot of X1 and X2 of the True Data (artificial data 1)
Figure B.2: Cross-plot of X1 and X2 in 200th MCMC Iteration (artificial data 1)
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Table B.1: Estimated Results using the Artificial Data 2 (true effect 3.7122).
Estimated ATT SD/SE
DP matching 3.6802 0.556
Radius matching via p-score 2.294 0.274
Stratification matching via p-
score
3.646 .
Nearest Neighbour matching
via p-score
3.853 0.226
Kernel matching via p-score 3.653 0.222
Notes: The first row presents the MCMC posterior mean and standard deviation of ATT estimator based
on DP matching. For the radius matching, the size of radius is 0.1 by default of the Stata pscore program
(Becker and Ichino, 2002). Kernel matching uses the Gaussian kernel with bandwidth 0.06 by default.
B.1.2 Exercise 2
This synthetic data is generated to mimic an observational study in which part of the
control group possess different distributions of covariates Xi. Firstly, 500 observations are
generated from three clusters and randomly divided into treatment and controlled groups.
Secondly, 450 additional ‘noisy’ controlled observations are constructed on the basis of two
different distributions. These additional control groups are supposed to be eliminated by
matching algorithms. Finally, their outcomes are defined by:
Control: Yi(0) = 0.25 + 1.4X1i + 2.5X2i + 3.8X3i +N (0, 1)
Treatment: Yi(1) = Yi(0) + 1.5 + 3X1i + 2.4X2i + 2.8X3i +N (0, 1)
hence, the true value of ATT is E(Yi(1)|Ti = 1)− E(Yi(0)|Ti = 1) = 1.6633.
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Figure B.3: Cross-plot of X1 and X2 of the True Data (artificial data 2)
Figure B.4: Cross-plot of X1 and X2 in 200th MCMC Iteration (artificial data 2)
178
Appendix B B.2. Visualizations of the Metaphor of Chinese Restaurant with Invited Guests
Table B.2: Estimated Results using the Artificial Data 2 (true effect 1.6633).
Estimated ATT SD/SE
DP matching 1.4809 0.230
Radius matching via p-score 3.797 1.190
Stratification matching via p-
score
2.227 0.457
Nearest Neighbour matching
via p-score
2.262 0.678
Kernel matching via p-score 1.254 0.373
Notes: The first row presents the MCMC posterior mean and standard deviation of ATT estimator based
on DP matching . For the radius matching, the size of radius is 0.1 by default of the Stata pscore program
(Becker and Ichino, 2002). Kernel matching uses the Gaussian kernel with bandwidth 0.06 by default.
B.2 Visualizations of the Metaphor of Chinese Restaurant
with Invited Guests
Figure B.5: Chinese Restaurant Process for the Treatment Group
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Figure B.6: Chinese Restaurant with Invited Guests
180
C Appendices to Chapter 3
181
Appendices to Chapter 3
Table C.1: Fathers’ Characteristics before Treatment (2012)
Note. The numbers attached in columns 1-3 of the last row of the table indicate the numbers of observations in the
treated sample, control sample and the total sample, respectively. Statistics are based on the 2012 survey of parents.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses in the column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. An F-test on the
overall significance of the pre- treatment variables is shown at the end of the table.
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Table C.2: Household Characteristics before Treatment (2012)
Note. The numbers attached in columns 1-3 of the last row of the table indicate the numbers of observations in the
treated sample, control sample and the total sample, respectively. Statistics are based on the 2012 survey. Standard
errors are presented in parentheses in the column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. An F-test on the overall
significance of the pre- treatment variables is shown at the end of the table.
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Table C.3: Household Characteristics before Treatment (2012)
Note. The numbers attached in columns 1-3 of the last row of the table indicate the numbers of observa-
tions in the treated sample, control sample and total sample, respectively. Statistics are based on the 2012
survey. Standard errors are presented in parentheses in the column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. An F-test on the overall significance of the pre- treatment variables is shown at the end of the table.
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Table C.7: Characteristics and Pre-program Outcomes of the Treat-
ment Sample and the Sample that Left the Program and Enrolled
between 2005 and 2009
Note. The column (1) is is based on the sample of mothers/children who enrolled between 2005 and 2009
and left the program. The column (2) is based on the sample who enrolled between 2005 and 2009 and left
in 4 years. The column (3) presents the treatment means based on the 2012 survey. Standard errors are
presented in parentheses in the column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.8: Estimated Effects of Number of Years in the Program on
Mothers’ Outcomes (2012)
Note. Each cell reports the estimated effect of years of treatment on the mothers’ outcome from a sepa-
rate regression based on the 2012 survey. Columns (1)-(2) present results using the original sample without
entropy balancing. Columns (3)-(4) stem from the weighted sample adjusted by entropy balancing. Stan-
dard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the maternal level; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p <0.01.
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Table C.9: Estimated Effects of Number of Years in the Program on
Mothers’ Outcomes (Pooled 2012 and 2013)
Note. Each cell reports the estimated effect of years of treatment on the mothers’ outcome from a separate
regression based on the 2012 and 2013 survey. Columns (1)-(2) present results using the original sample
without entropy balancing. Columns (3)-(4) stem from the weighted sample adjusted by entropy balanc-
ing. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the maternal level; * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05, *** p <0.01.
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d
sa
m
pl
e
ad
ju
st
ed
by
en
tr
op
y
ba
la
nc
in
g.
St
an
-
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
pr
es
en
te
d
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
an
d
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
m
at
er
na
l
le
ve
l;
*
p
<
0.
1,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
**
*
p
<
0.
01
.
†
Si
gn
s
of
ou
tc
om
es
of
sc
ho
ol
in
g
dr
op
ou
t
an
d
gr
ad
e
re
pe
ti
ti
on
ar
e
re
ve
rs
ed
w
he
n
ca
lc
ul
at
in
g
th
e
ov
er
al
l
su
m
m
ar
y
in
de
x.
194
